Saturday, April 28, 2007



آزربايجان توركي و آذربايجان پارسي
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حميد دباغي
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dabbagi@yahoo.com

حركت ملي دموكراتيك ملت تورك و مملكت آزربايجان جنوبي كه حاليا شاهد آنيم، در كل تاريخ اين ملت و اين مملكت، هرگز به اندازه امروزين داراي مضمون و استقامت توركي، ملي، دمكراتيك، مدرن، جهاني و علمي نبوده است. اين مضمون و استقامت بسيار غني و بيسابقه، خود را در اهداف، مفاهيم، شعارها و متدهاي مشخصي جلوه گر مي سازد كه تدقيق هر كدام، فورا روح و هويت توركي، ملي، دمكراتيك، مدرن، جهاني و علمي آنرا آشكار مي سازد. بيسابقگي اين مضمون و استقامت يكي نيز در گستره و عمق آن است، به نحوي كه در مدتي نسبتا كوتاه توانسته است خود را بر عرصه هاي سابقا هرگز دست نخورده و بسيار نوئي مانند تئرمينولوژي، سمبلها، نشانه ها و حتي املا و اورتوقرافي – نه تنها زبان توركي بلكه زبان فارسي هم- تحميل نمايد.





از ديدگاه زبانشناسناسانه صرف، حركت به سوي املا و اورتوقرافي توركي تماما فونئتيك و بدون تناقض داخلي كه كاملا از قيد و بندهاي املا مغلوط و نارساي زبان فارسي و يا املاهاي محافظه كارانه التقاطي فارسي-توركي رها شده باشد، نياز و ضرورتي تاريخي براي انكشاف زبان توركي در ايران است. ايجاد املا و اورتوقرافي تماما فونئتيك و رها از قواعد املا زبان بيگانه، تحميلي و استعماري فارسي، در عين حال به لحاظ منافع سياسي و ملي ملت تورك نيز يك نياز و ضرورت تاريخي است. اين چنين املا تماما فونئتيك و رها از يوغ املا فارسي در عرصه اورتوقرافي در مقابل املاهاي محافظه كارانه فارس محور ويا املاهاي فارسي-توركي التقاطي، معادل انديشه تورك محوري و آزربايجان مركزي در مقابل انديشه هاي فارس محوري و فارسستان مركزي (مدافع و مبلغ مفاهيم نادرستي مانند هويت قومي، ملت ايران، زبان ملي و مشترك فارسي، هويت ملي ايراني ...) در عرصه سياسي است. خوشبختانه امروزه گرايش غالب در نوشته هاي مختلف مطبوع و اينترنتي توركي و آزربايجاني بويژه در ميان نسل جوان هويتجو- عليرغم وجود برخي مقاومتها و اصرارها بر كاربرد املا فارسي و يا املاهاي التقاطي فارسي-توركي براي زبان توركي از سوي شماري از محافظه كاران- حركت به سوي املاي منطقي، يكدست و تماما فونئتيك تورك مركز (در عرصه زباني، در عرصه سياسي) است.

يكي از عواقب طبيعي اتخاذ املاي يك دست فونئتيك براي زبان توركي، مساله تحول لاجرم در نگارش فونئتيك و توركي برخي از اسامي و نامها مانند آزربايجان، تورك، آزر، قاشقاي، اورميه، باي بك و ... به ترتيب به جاي آذربايجان، ترك، آذري، قشقائي، اروميه، بابك و .... است. رسم الخط اين گونه نامها هم از جنبه املا فونئتيك زبان توركي و هم از جنبه پيام رساني، انعكاس ماهيت تورك مركزي و هويت ضد استعماري، علمي و مدرنيست حاكم بر حركت ملي دمكراتيك تورك و آزربايجاني شايان توجه است. همچنين اتخاذ نگارشهاي متفاوت و نو براي مقولات و مفاهيم نزديك اما جدايي كه در زبان فارسي با بي دقتي فراوان به يك شكل نشان داده مي شوند (مانند توركمان و تركمن، موغول و مونقول و....)، نشان از تعميق ديدگاهها، شناخت دقيقتر و شفاف سازي هرچه بيشتر ابهامات سابقا موجود، از سوي نخبگان و صاحبنظران تورك دارد. در زير به نحوه نگارش چند نام از اين قبيل اشاره شده است:




"تورك" و "توركي" به جاي "ترك" و "تركي"

در سال ٢٠٠٥ در افغانستان، كشوري رها يافته از قوميتگرائي پشتون دولت طالبان كه اخيرا هشت زبان عمده رايج خود را رسمي اعلام كرده است، سمیناري بنام «انکشاف زبانهای تورکی افغانستان» برگزار شد. در قطعنامه مصوبه اين سمينار در باره مساله نحوه نگارش نام زبان "توركي" در افغانستان، چنين گفته مي شود: "..... کلمة تورکی به دو شکل «ترکی» و «تورکی» در متون کلاسیک ادبی ما دیده میشود. لذا به خاطر جلوگیری از پراگنده گی در نوشتار، شکل گرافیم (تورکی) ترجیح داده شود و این شکل در نوشتار دایماً به صورت یکسان مراعات گردد". در ايران نيز به دلايلي مشابه، مساله نگارش واحد و استاندارد نام تورك و يا ترك وجود دارد. اما در جمهوري اسلامي ايران تحت حاكميت قوميتگرايان فارس، متاسفانه هنوز هيچ زباني به جز زبان محلي قوم اقليت فارس رسمي و دولتي نيست و از اينرو مساله استاندارديزاسيون اين نام بر عكس روال معمول در جهان متمدن، نه در سطح رسمي و توسط نهادهاي آكادميك و مراكز دولتي مسئول مربوطه، بلكه در سطح كاربردها و ترجيحهاي فردي روشنفكران و فرهنگيان تورك به پيش رانده مي شود.

در زبان فارسي "ترك" براي ناميدن دو مفهوم متفاوت، يكي گسترده و ديگري محدود بكار مي رود:

الف- نخست معادل TURKIC انگليسي به معني عمومي و گسترده براي ناميدن خانواده اي زباني داخل در گروه زبانهاي آلتائيك و نام عمومي هر كدام از ملل و اقوام متكلم به يكي از زبانهاي متعلق به اين خانواده زباني در آوراسيا. در محافل روشنفكري تورك و آزربايجاني براي اين منظور عموما از فرم "تورك" استفاده ميشود؛

ب- ديگري معادل TURKISH انگليسي به معني خاص و محدود براي ناميدن ملت به لحاظ شمار اول ايران كه بخش عمده آن در آزربايجان جنوبي، قاشقاي يورد در جنوب ايران و آفشاريورد در شمال خراسان ساكن است و نيز ملت عمده ساكن در تركيه ويا زبانهاي ايندو. برخي از فعالين سياسي و فرهنگي "ترك"، بدين معنا نيز كلمه "تورك" را بكار مي برند. ترجيح و كاربرد شكل "تورك" از طرف اين گروه براي ناميدن ملت خود، به منظور تاكيد بر تعلق ملت تورك ساكن در ايران به خانواده ملل توركي و يا دنياي تورك – از طريق نوشتن اين نام بر اساس فونئتيك زبان توركي- و نفي تعلق آن به دنياي ايراني (كه شامل فارسها، كردها، بلوچها، پشتونها، تاجيكها و … ميشود) – از طريق اجتناب از نگارش اين نام به فرم رايج "ترك" در زبان فارسي است.

نگارش نام "تورك" به شكل فونئتيك به هر دو معني محدود و گسترده، همچنين ناشي از تمايل فزاينده براي ثبت و نگارش صحيح و فونئتيك كلمات توركي بويژه نامهاي شخصيتهاي تاريخي و اقوام و دول و ايلات و ... در زبان فارسي است كه در ادبيات سياسي و علمي معاصر ايران مشاهده مي شود. به نظر ميرسد برآيند عوامل فوق يعني ضرورت ثبت اسامي توركي با تلفظ صحيح آنها، تاكيد بر هويت توركي زبان و ملت اول ايران، تاكيد بر تعلق اين دو به دنياي تورك، حركت به سوي املا كاملا فونئتيك توركي و استانداردسازي نگارش نام اين ملت و زبان، در شرف شكل دادن اجماعي در نگارش نام ايندو در زبان فارسي به شكل "ملت تورك" و "زبان توركي" است.

"آزربايجان" به جاي "آذربايجان"

در مورد ريشه شناسي نام آزربايجان در اوائل قرن بيستم در ايران و اروپا در منابع فارسي، ارمني و برخي منابع اروپائي چندين تئوري رايج شد، از جمله اينكه اين نام معرب تركيب ايراني آذرآبادگان- آتروپاتگان به معني محل نگهداري آتشها ويا نگاهبان آتش (آذر-آدر از كلمه اوستائي آثه ره و يا آده ره به معني آتش) بوده و يا از نام سرداري ايراني بنام آتروپاتئس و ... ريشه گرفته است. اين تئوريهاي قطعي نشده مانند ادعاهاي اثبات نشده اي از قبيل وجود آتشكده هاي متعدد زرتشتي در آزربايجان و حتي تولد زرتشت در اين مملكت، از طرف دولت باستانگراي پهلوي و نخبگان و دولتمردان قوميتپرست و فرهنگيان نژادگراي فارس در كوتاه مدت با آغوش باز پذيرفته و سپس در مقياس كشوري و جهاني بازتوليد و تبليغ شدند. (اكنون قطعي شده است كه بسياري از اين اوجاقها- و نه آتشكده ها- يادگار تقديس و احترام به آتش - امري از ديرباز مشترك و رايج در بسياري از فرهنگها و تمدنها و اديان در سراسر جهان و از جمله در فرهنگ توركي و تمدنهاي بومي آزربايجان - مي باشند و ربطي به زرتشتيگري ندارند. علاوه بر آن مدتهاست كه ادعاي تولد زرتشت در آزربايجان به طور قطعي رد شده است. معتقدان به وجود واقعي وي نيز، او را شترچراني احتمالا متولد آسياي ميانه، جائي در ازبكستان فعلي مي دانند. اضافتا در حال حاضر وجود شخصي واقعي و تاريخي بنام زرتشت در عالم علم از اساس مورد سوال و محل ترديد بوده، بسياري از صاحبنظران وي را شخصيتي افسانه اي-اسطوره اي و غيرتاريخي، غيرواقعي مي دانند). از آنروز تاكنون اين تئوريهاي اثبات نشده و ادعاهاي مردود از طرف ماشين تبليغاتي، فرهنگي و آموزشي دولت پهلوي و جمهوري اسلامي ايران فربه تر شده و در جهت هويتزدائي توركي و هويتسازي ايراني به معني نادرست ملي و غيرتوركي براي مملكت آزربايجان و ملت تورك بكار گرفته شده اند.

طرفه آنكه تئوريهاي مطرح ديگري كه همزمان و در همان سالها مساله توركي بودن نام آزربايجان را به پيش كشيده بودند از سوي اين دسته جات و نهادها بالكل ناديده گرفته شدند و يا از انظار و افكار عمومي مخفي گرديدند. اما اينك پس از گذشت قربب به دو سده از آغاز ماجرا، به موازات كشف و تجمع يافته هاي نو، انتشار منابع جديدي كه قبلا در دسترس نبوده اند، پيشرفت در شاخه هاي مربوطه علم تاريخ، مردم شناسي، توركولوژي، ميتولوژي، باستانشناسي و ائتنوقرافي و با اهميت يافتن دوباره روايتهاي مردمي در تاريخ شناسي مدرن، مساله كاملا به صورت ديگري درآمده است. هر روز كه ميگذرد در نظر اهل فن، تئوريهاي توركي منشا بودن نام آزربايجان، كه با روايتهاي مردمي و قرائن تاريخي دال بر توركي بودن اين نام نيز تقويت ميشوند مقبوليت و اعتبار بيشتري كسب مي كنند. در زير به برخي از اين تئوريها اشاره ميشود:

تئوري آز+ار+باي/ به ي/ بي+قان

طبق اين تئوري، بخش اول نام آزربايجان ماخوذ از نام قوم باستاني تورك "آز" و يا "آزر" (آز+ار) بوده (نگاه كنيد به مدخل آزر و آذري زيرين) و بخش دوم آن نيز به شكل "باي+قانBAY+QAN " و يا "به ي+قانBƏY+QAN " قابل تقطيع است. بنا به اين ريشه يابيها "آزربايجانAZƏRBAYCAN " به معني سرزمين آزرهاي محتشم و "آزربه يجانAZƏRBƏYCAN " به معني سرزمين سركرده آزرها است. عده اي نيز اين نام را به شكل "آزربيجانAZƏRBİCAN "، "آزر+بي+قان" كه در آن پسوند "–بي-Bİ " پسوند جمع ساز و يا به معني قوم است تقطيع نموده اند. "-بي-Bİ " و يا "-پي-Pİ " پسوند جمع به زبان ايلامي در نام بعضي از اقوام مانند قوم باستاني "لولوبي" (لولو+بي، لو ويا لولو به زبان سومري به معني انسان و مرد است)، "ائللي پي"، "مادا پي"، "سوو پي" و بنا به عده اي "آزر+بي" در نام "آزربيجان" است. برخي از صاحبنظران پسوند قوم ساز -بي را واريانت كلمه بودون-بوي توركي به معني قوم و خلق دانسته اند. بنا به اين ريشه يابي "آزربيجانAZƏRBİCAN " به معني سرزمين آزرها (قوم آزر) است.

"به يBƏY " ("بكBƏK "، "بگBƏG "، "به يگBƏYG "، "بيگBİG "٬ "به يBƏY " و "بيBİ " همه فرمهاي گوناگون يك كلمه توركي اند) در فرهنگ سياسي دول توركي عموما به معناي امير، درجه اي بالاتر از "آقاAQA " و پايين تر از "خانXAN " و "خاقانXAQAN " و همچنين معناي عاليرتبه، بزرگ، مسئول، مافوق، شوهر، آقا و ... بكار رفته است. كلمه "بايBAY " در زبان توركي به معني غني، صاحب، سرور، محتشم، ثروتمند، مقتدر، توانا و .... است. "باييماق" و "باييتماق" در تركي قديم به معني ثروتمند شدن و ثروتمند كردن، اعمار، مرفه و آباد نمودن است. از تركيب "باي+ آغوت" كلمه "باياغوت" ساخته شده كه به معني غني است. "آغوت" پسوند تحبيب در تركي باستان است مانند "آلپاغوت" = "آلپ + آغوت" به معني دلاور محبوب. اكثرا كلمه توركي "بايات" (بيات) را فرم جديد "باياغوت" ميدانند. "بيات" نام يكي از طوائف 24 گانه اوغوز است كه در تشكل ملل تركمن و تورك (در ايران بخصوص از جنوب همدان تا سواحل خليج فارس، در آزربايجان، عراق و تركيه) و فرهنگ توركي نقش بسيار اساسي داشته است. دده قورقود، كوراوغلو، فضولي همه از بياتها هستند. در توركي مدرن "بايات" به معني قديمي و كهنه است.

عده "باي" توركي را ماخوذ از كلمه "بايان" مونقولي دانسته اند. در زبان مغولي "بايان" به معني ثروتمند و قدرتمند است. اين كلمه به شكل اوليه خود بايان در ميان تركان باستان آوار، اون اوغور و اويغورها و ديگر اقوام آلتايي نيز رايج بوده است. عنوان" بايان" لقب بزرگترين خاقان توركهاي اويغور "بايان چور" (به معني شاهزاده ثروتمند) است. "بايان" بعدها به شكل "بوگ يان" وارد زبان روسي شده، در زبانهاي اسلاوي شبه جزيره بالكان به شكل "بان" و به معني والي بكار رفته و همچنين به زبان مجاري نيز وارد شده است. عنوان "بايان" در نام طائفه توركي "باياندور، بايندر، بايندور، باييندير" از توركهاي اوغوز نيز موجود است. "-دور" پسوند تكثير در نام قبائل توركي است مانند "چاولدور". باياندورها يكي از قبايل توركي هستند كه در قرون وسطي در تمام ايران، بين النهرين، آناتولي و قفقاز پراكنده شده بودند. بايندورها موسس يكي از مهمترين دولتهاي تركهاي آزربايجاني توركمان در تاريخ يعني دولت "آغ قويونلو" و يا "بايندريه" ميباشند. عده اي نام بايات (بيات) توركي را نيز جمع قديم كلمه بايان دانسته اند. (در توركي باستان برخي از اسامي و عناوين مختوم به "ن"، با تبديل آن به "ت" جمع بسته شده اند، مانند تارخات، تيگيت و بايات كه به ترتيب جمع تارخان، تيگين و بايان اند).

پسوند ائتنوتوپونيم ساز توركي "-غان-ĞAN " "-قان-QAN "، "-گان-GAN "، "-كه ن-KƏN " نشان دهنده جا، مكان و محلهاي جغرافيائي است. اين پسوند در توپونيمهاي باستاني مانند كورقان-قورقان (پشته اي كوچك بر مزار مرسوم در ميان اقوام اوراسيا در ٥ هزار سال پيش. بعدها به معني استحكامات و قلعه و ...)، قاديرقان، خينقان (سينجان)، بارسيغان-بارسقان، قارقان (قاراقان-خرقان، معادل قوراخان مونغولي. رود كوچك، باريكه آب كوهستاني)، قاتقان (خم، انحنا، كج و مورب)، يارقان، يارليغان (از اسامي جزائر درياچه اورميه. محل پرتگاه، كناره دره، شكستهاي كنار رودخانه)، چالاغان (از اسامي جزائر درياچه اورميه. محل زندگي طائفه چالا-چلا از توركان قيپچاق)، اٶتوكه ن (نام الهه مكان. كلمه اي اصلا مونقولي) و ... بكار رفته است. اين پسوند در توپونيمهاي بيشماري در سرزمينهائي كه روزگاري تحت حاكميت اقوام آلتائي، پروتوتورك و تورك بوده اند بويژه در آزربايجان بيادگار مانده است، از آن جمله نامهاي جغرافيائي زير اند: بلاسجان-بلاشگان، داخرقان-توفارقان، بيلقان-بايلاقان، مغان-موغان، زنگان-زنجان، سيساقان- سيسجان، يئكه ن، شانجان، سدقان (صدقان)، چادگان (چادقان)، چٶهره قان، دليجان، انديجان، ديلمقان، نوشيجان، كميجان، ورزقان، گوگان، گرگان-جرجان، واسپورقان، ارزينجان، اوجان، ترجان، مزلقان، چاپاقان-چپقان، جنقان-جنگان، جوشقان، و... پسوند "-قان-QAN " از طريق قوم و يا اتحاديه اقوام پروتوتورك ساكا به زبان پارتيان و از آنجا به زبانهاي ايراني وارد و پس از استيلاي عرب و نفوذ فرهنگ زباني عربي تبديل به "-جان-CAN " شده است.

روايت مردمي برهان قاطع

در باره ريشه شناسي توركي نام آزربايجان روايات مردمي چندي موجودند. يكي از جالبترين آنها را محمد خلف تبريزي در اثر خويش برهان قاطع ثبت كرده است. اين روايت داراي عناصر زباني است كه آن را بسيار كهن مي نماياند، از جمله ذكر "آغور" به جاي "اوغوز" و كاربرد پسوند جمع توركي قديم "-ان-ƏN ": "...... گويند وقتيکه آغور [اوغوز خان] آن ولايت گرفت، صحرا و مرغزار اوجان - که يکي از محال ولايت آذربايجان است- او را خوش آمد و فرمود که هر يک از مردم او يک دامن خاک بياورند و آنجا بريزند؛ و خود به نفس خود يک دامن خاک آورد و بريخت. تمامت لشگر و مردم هر يک دامني خاک بياوردند و بريختند. پشته اي عظيم برهم رسيد، نام آن پشته را آذربايگان کرد. ….. چه آذر به لغت ترکي به معني بلند است و بايگان به معني بزرگان و محتشمان؛ و آنجا را با آن مشهور گردانيد….". در كتاب فرهنگ رشيدي تاليف رشيد الّدين متوفّاي ١٦٥٤ ميلادى نيز نقل ميشود اوغوز خاقان از شروان بر خاست و به اران رفت و از آنجا آمد به مغان، به اوجان آمد و در آنجا ساكن شد. نام اين مناطق را آذربايجان گذاشت.

الف- در تركي قديم پسوند جمعي به شكل "-ه ن-ƏN " ويا "-ان-AN " موجود بوده است. مثلا در تركي قديم كلمه "ارƏR " به شكل "اره نƏRƏN " (مردان، جوانمردان) با استفاده از اين پسوند جمع بسته شده است. محتمل است نام بعضي از اقوام نيز با استفاده از اين پسوند جمع بسته شده باشد، مانند "آزان" به معني آزها (از قوم آز) و "خازاران" به معني خزرها (نام محله اي در شهر اورميه). عده اي كلمات "خيزان" و "اوغلان" در زبان توركي را نيز جمع با پسوند "–ان" كلمات "خيز" (قيز) و "اوغول" دانسته اند. در روايت برهان قاطع نيز "بايگان"، احتمالا فرم جمع قديمي كلمه "بيگ-به يگBƏYG " (به معني امرا و بزرگان) ويا "بايBAY " (به معني ثروتمند و غني) است. با اين فرض ميتوان چنين استنتاج كرد كه يا كلمه "به يگBƏYG " نخست به شكل "به يگه نBƏYGƏN " جمع بسته شده و سپس در اثر آنالوژي با فرم جمع "بايانBAYAN "، به "بايگانBAYQAN " تبديل گرديده است؛ و يا كلمه "بايBAY " نخست به شكل "بايانBAYAN " جمع بسته شده و سپس در اثر آنالوژي با فرم جمع "به يگه نBƏYGƏN "، به "بايگانBAYQAN " تبديل شده است.

ب- "آذر" به معني بلند در اين روايت، احتمالا مخفف و محرف "اوجايئرUCAYER " به معني جاي بلند و يا فرم ديگري از "اوزه رÜZƏR " توركي به معني قسمت فوقاني و روئين و بالائي... است (اوزه ÜZƏ در توركي باستان به معني فوقاني و مرتفع است). تبديل صداي "ج" به "ز" (و "چ" به "س") در برخي از لهجه هاي توركي مانند تبديل "بنزه مك" به "بنجه مك" در بعضي لهجه هاي توركي آزربايجان، "جول" قاراچاي به "زول" در توركي بالكار (به معني راه) و تبديل "اجل" عربي به "ازل" در توركي قازان مشاهده شده است.

ج- يكي ديگر از نشانه هاي قدمت اين روايت، ذكر فرم آغور (اوقور) باستاني به جاي اوغوز متاخر است. تبديل "ر" اصلي آلتائيك و توركي باستان به "ز" (مانند گٶر-گٶز، تور-توزاق، يور-يوز، ...) در زبان توركي پديده اي نو و مربوط به هزاره اخير است، "ر" اصلي كه در توركي به "ز" تغيير يافته، در زبانهاي مونقولي، ياكوت، چوواش و مجاري همچنان حفظ شده است.

ذال معجمه، الف ممدود و هويت ملي: در خط و زبان توركي معاصر حرف و صداي "ذ" (ذال معجمه) وجود ندارد. عده اي بدين سبب و نيز به منظور تاكيد بر ريشه شناسي توركي نام آزربايجان و هويت توركي اش، بر نگارش اين نام به شكل "آزربايجان" تاكيد دارند. در طرف مقابل نيز، تاكيد بر كاربرد شكل "آذربايجان" از طرف نژادپرستان آريائي و قوميتگرايان افراطي فارس و نهادهاي رسمي دولتين پهلوي و جمهوري اسلامي، به منظور تاكيد بر پارسي بودن اين نام و مملكت و نفي هويت توركي آن است. (علاوه بر نگارش، تلفظ نام آزربايجان به دو زبان توركي و فارسي نيز متفاوت است. حرف اول اين نام به توركي كه در آن صداي "آ" ممدود و يا بلند وجود ندارد، با الف كوتاه (A-a) و به فارسي كه داراي صداي الف كوتاه نيست، با "آ" ي بلند و يا ممدود (Â-â) ادا مي شود).

فرمهاي ديگر نام آزربايجان: در زبان توركي تلفظ صداي فتحه در ميان سه الف كوتاه در نام آزربايجان (AZƏRBAYCAN)، به لحاظ قانون هماهنگي اصوات ثقيل است. از اينرو اين نام در آزربايجان شمالي گاها به شكل آزيربايجان (AZIRBAYCAN) و در تركيه به شكل آزاربايجان (AZARBAYCAN) و يا آزئربئيجان (AZERBEYCAN) تلفظ مي شود. تبديل آزر به آزار (مانند ساوار، قاجار، آوشار) و يا به آزير (مانند سابير، يازير) در نام اقوام به لحاظ فونئتيك زبان توركي پديده اي قانونمند و مسبوق به سابقه تاريخي است.

همچنين در نحوه نگارش نام آزربايجان بين پان ايرانيستها، قوميتگرايان فارس و نهادهاي دولتي جمهوري اسلامي و توركان از طرف ديگر تفاوت وجود دارد. در حاليكه گروه اول نام آزربايجان را، بويژه هنگام اشاره به آزربايجان جنوبي تعمدا به اشكال نادرستي مانند AZARBAIDJAN و AZARBAIJAN مي نويسند، توركان و آزربايجان اين نام را به شكل واحد و صحيح آن يعني AZERBAIJAN بكار مي برند. (گاها در منابع ارمني نام آزربايجان به شكل AZVERBAIJAN آورده مي شود. ZVER در زبان روسي به معني حيوان است)

"آزر" (AZƏR- AZER) به جاي "آذري" (AZARY-AZARI-AZERI)

در ريشه شناسي توركي نام آزربايجان چندين تئوري وجود دارد. در همه اين تئوريها (به استثناي روايت برهان قاطع كه آذر را به توركي به معني بلند شمرده است) وجود پسوند اسم تبار و قومساز "ار" در هجاي دوم اين نام مدافعه ميشود. كلمه "ار" ("آر" در توركي غربي و چوواش، "اير" در توركي شرقي، "هر" در توركي خلج٬ "يئر" در توركي ساري اويغور، "اور" در زبان سومري) (ER, ƏR, AR, IR, İR, UR, YER, HƏR) به معاني انسان، مرد، مردم، جوانمرد، قهرمان، سرباز، رزمنده و ....... است. اين كلمه در توركي باستان و قديم به عنوان پسوند براي ساختن نام اقوام، تبارها، گروهها و ايلات و طائفه ها نيز بكار رفته است. مانند قاجار، افشار، ساوار- سووار- سابير، يازه ر -يازر- يازير، آجار - آجير، تاتار، خزه ر- خزر، كنگر-كنگه ر، آوار-آپار، ماجار، ميشه ر، هونقار، بالخار- بالكار، خومار-خمر-خمار، بوله ر- بولقار- بلغار٬... (معادل پسوند باستاني نام قومساز "ار" در توركي مدرن پسوند "-لي"، "-لو" مي باشد. جالب آنكه "لو" به زبان سومري نيز به معني انسان و مرد است). برخي منابع ريشه شناسي٬ بخش دوم از نام گروههاي معروف به پروتوتورك مانند "كيمر-جومر، سومر" و حتي "توخار" را نيز همين كلمه "ار" دانسته اند. كاربرد "ار" در نام اشخاص و در نامگذاري گروههاي مختلف انساني در دوران توركان سلجوقي بويژه سلجوقيان غرب و حكومتهاي محلي تورك در آزربايجان و آسياي صغير٬ حتي در دوره عثمانيان بسيار رايج بوده است. به عنوان مثال: گون اري=گونري (مرد روز يا با توتم خورشيد)٬ قوم اري (مرد ريگزار٬ شخصي كه در دشت زندگي ميكند)٬ آغاج اري=آغاجري (انسان با توتم درخت٬ شخصي كه در جنگل زندگي ميكند)٬ داغ اري (شخص كوهستاني)٬ دويون اري٬ اؤلوم اري (محكوم به اعدام)٬ تورك اري=تركري (شخص تورك)٬ سو اري (شخص نظامي)، قز اري-غز اري (شخص منسوب به اوغوزها)، دنيز اري، قويون اري٬ يابان اري (بيگانه٬ شاخه اي از توركمانهاي جنوب حلب مهاجرت كرده به سيواس)٬ ايل اري (بومي٬ محلي)٬....

تئوري قوم آز-آزر: عده اي نام "آزر" را مركب از دو بخش "آز" و "ار" دانسته اند. در شماري از متون تاريخي پيش و پس از اسلام به اقوامي بنام "آز" و اسامي مشابه آن اشاراتي شده است. از جمله در سنگ نوشته هاي گٶك تورك (تون يوقوق)، چرم نوشته هاي تورفان، راحه الصدور (راوندي)، جامع التواريخ، صوره الارض (ابن حوقل)، مروج الذهب (مقدسي)، المسالك و الممالك (ابن خردادبه)، معجم البلدان، سفرنامه ابن بطوطه، ديوان لغات الترك (به شكل "آز كيشي"، يعني انسان آزي)، كتاب دده قورقود و ....... هنوز آشكار نشده است اين گروههاي متعدد قومي واحداند ويا هر كدام قومي جداگانه اند. همچنين در منشا تباري و زباني اين اقوام نيز مباحثه وجود دارد. در تاريخ و روزگار معاصر در ميان ملل تورك نيز (بولغار، تاتار، ازبك، قازاق، قيرقيز، باشقورد، آلتاي، توركمن، قاراچاي-بالكار، ....) به اقوام و تيره ها و در محل سكونت و حاكميت اين اقوام در ناحيه بسيار وسيعي در اوراسيا به نامهاي جغرافيائي بيشماري مي توان برخورد كه در نام خود عنصر "آز" ويا "آس" و مشابه آنرا داشته باشند. يكي از اين اقوام قومي پروتوتورك - آلتائيك در پيرامون درياي خزر بنام آز، آس، آسي (آسيانيها، آسيناها، ويا آلانهاي بعدي)، ياز و يا جاز (در زبانهاي اسلاوي) است. اين طائفه پروتوتورك در طول تاريخ خود با اقوام اسلاويان روابط نزديك انساني داشته كه خود را از جمله به شكل ازدواج مخصوصا ميان رهبران و روساي طوائف دو طرف جلوه گر ميساخته است. گروهي طائفه ياز -ياس - يازيق (YAZYG) را كه در نواحي مولدوايا و اوكرايناي فعلي مي زيسته و بر اقوام اسلاويان آن منطقه و اروپاي شرقي حكم مي رانده اند و از اجداد مجاريان بشمار ميروند را نيز منسوب به همين طائفه پروتوتورك "آز" دانسته اند. عده اي از محققين قوم قيرقيز را نيز منسوب به قوم آز دانسته و نام قيرقيز را به شكل "قيريق+آز" (چهل آز) تقطيع كرده اند. در سنگ نوشته هاي تون يوقوق، آزها وابسته به اقوام تورك، تورگيش و قيرقيزها شمرده شده اند. در اين سنگ نوشته ها علاوه بر تركيب "آز بودونAZ BUDUN " (قوم آز)، "آز ائلليكAZ ELLİK " (مملكت آز)، حتي تركيبي عينا به شكل " آز اريAZ ƏRİ " به معني "انسان منسوب به قوم آز" وجود دارد.

طبق معتقدان اين تئوري، آزر كه نام آزربايجان از آن ماخوذ است نام حكومت ايلي و دولت قومي تورك در منطقه شمال غرب ايران، جنوب قفقاز و شرق كشور تركيه بوده كه قرنها پيش از ميلاد مسيح بر بسياري از اقوام و قبايل ديگر آن منطقه از جمله بر اوزها حكومت ميكرده است. پانصد سال پس از سقوط دولت آزان، در اين نواحي دولت ميديا تشكيل شده است. در عهد عتيق در آزربايجان و نواحي دور و نزديك ديگر در آسيا به نامهاي جغرافي به شكل آزار و ... مي توان برخورد كرد. از جمله شهر "آزار" بين اورميه و كركوك (قرن هشتم پيش از ميلاد)، ناحيه "آزار" در ايروان چوخورو (قرن اول)، معبد "آزاري" در جنوب ماد (قرن اول)، شهرهاي "آزارا" و "آزارابا" (آزر اوبا) در پيرامون درياي آزاق (قرن دوم) و .... عده اي نامهاي ارس (آر+از)، سلماس (سالم+از) حتي آسيا را با نام اين قوم مربوط دانسته اند. نام طائفه "آز" در زبان مونقولي به شكل آزوت و در متون فارسي به شكل "آزان" جمع بسته شده (راحة ‌الصدور: اندر تاختن‌ ملك‌ آزان‌ بر اوزان)، هرچند ممكن است كه اين شكل فارسي نبوده و جمع كلمه "آز" با استفاده از پسوند جمعساز توركي باستاني "-ان" بوده باشد (نگاه كنيد به بند الف از روايت مردمي برهان قاطع). در منابع عربي از زبان اين قوم بنام "الاذيه" (منسوب به قوم آز) و يا "الاذريه" (منسوب به قوم آزر) ياد شده است. بنابراين، ظن عده اي كه فرم "آذري" را مخفف كلمه آذربايجان دانسته اند، كاملا نادرست است. "آذري" مخفف نام آذربايجان نيست، "ي" آخر كلمه "آذري"، ياي نسبت بوده و "آذري" در زبانهاي فارسي و عربي بيگمان به معني "منسوب به آذر" است.

تئوري قوم ياز-يازير: عده اي نام آزر را تخفيف نام طائفه باستاني توركي يازير (يازر-يازار- يازغير و يا يازقير) دانسته اند. اين نام به معاني كسي كه بر ممالك بسيار هجوم برده، آنها را تصرف نموده و بر آنها حاكم است؛ آنكه ديگران را وادار به اطاعت كردن ميكند، طائفه ساكن در دشت (يازي)، فرمانروا ويا صاحب ممالك بسيار و وسيع، بزرگ خلق .... آمده است. بسياري از قوم شناسان و زبانشناسان اين نام را به صورت يازي+ار به معني انسان دشتي تقطيع ميكنند، برخي نيز با تقطيع آن به شكل ياز+ار در صدد ايجاد ارتباط بين قوم ياز-ياس با قوم آز-آس فوق الذكر برآمده اند. يازير-يزر ويا يازرها مانند كنگرها٬ بلغار-بولقارها٬ سابير-ساوورها٬ خلج-قالاچها٬ آوار-آبيرها٬ خزرها٬ هون و آق هونها٬ قيپچاق-كومانها٬ پچنك-بجنه ها٬ بارسيل-بورچاليها، آغاج اري- آغاچري، هون٬ بون تورك، ساراقور٬ اون اوغور٬ اوقور و .... در زمره قديميترين گروههاي توركي شناخته شده پيش از اسلام در آزربايجان٬ ايران و آسياي صغير ميباشند. اين گروههاي توركي بويژه در دوره ساسانيان در بسياري از مناطق روستايي و شباني آزربايجان پخش شده و اسكان گزيده بودند. بخش آسياي ميانه اي يازرها در آخال تركمنستان كنوني، دولتي مستقل به پايتختي تاق و يا تاق يازير تاسيس نموده اند. يازيرها در دوره اسلامي به عنوان يكي از طوائف ٢٤ گانه اوغوز، از شاخه بوز اوخها (تير خاكستري) و از فرزندان آيخان شمرده ميشدند. پس از حمله مونقول، آنها در موجي دوم به نواحي گوناگوني از جمله آزربايجان و آسياي صغير (در اطراف ايسپارتا و بورسا) پراكنده شده اند.

تئوري قوم كاس-قاز: گروهي از محققين، نام آزر را تخفيف قاسر-قاسه ر و يا قازر-قازه ر ماخوذ از نام طائفه باستاني توركي كاس- قاس- قاز، .... دانسته اند. (قاسر: قاس+ار، قازر: قاز+ار، آزر: آز+ار). قاسهاي ساكن در غرب درياي خزر و قفقاز، همچون توركهاي خزر قومي جزيره نشين و با چشماني آبي رنگ و موهايي بلوند توصيف شده اند. نام اين قوم در ريشه شناسي نام ملت "قازاق" و كلمات "قفقاز"، "قزوين" و "كاسپي" نيز مطرح گرديده است. (برخي از محققين مانند محمود كاشغري در ديوان لغات الترك، نام شهر قزوين آزربايجان را با نام قاز، دختر افراسياب مرتبط دانسته و آنرا به شكل قاز+اويون و يا بازيگاه قاز، دختر افراسياب ريشه يابي كرده اند: "كوز- قاز " نام دختر افراسياب "خاقان" بنيادگزار خاندان سلطنت "خان"ها، "تگين" ها و "تريم" ها، و پدر قاز، بارمان، و بارس قان كه هر كدام به نام خويش شهري پي افكندند مي باشد. شهري كه به اسم "قاز" نامگذاري شد شهر قزوين در آزربايجان ايران، كه اصل آن " كاز اويني- قاز اوينو" (به تركي بازيگاه قاز) مي باشد است، زيرا كه وي در آنجا ساكن بود و بازي مي نمود). طبق اين تئوري نام قازاق به شكل قاسوق (قاس+اوق) و يا قاساخي (قاس+آخي)، و نام اروپائي درياي خزر، كاسپي به شكل قاس+پي تقطيع ميشوند. (براي پسوند –پي به تئوري آز+ار+باي+قان مراجعه كنيد). كلمه قز-قاز-قاد-كاس-كاد، ريشه كلمه "قايا"ي توركي امروزي به معني صخره، در توركي و ديگر زبانهاي آلتايي به معني صخره، كوه صخره دار و شيب تند ميباشد. (در متون اورخون، "قاديز" به معني پرتگاه صخره اي است).

تئوري قوم خزر: عده اي نام "آزر" را با قوم توركي "خزه ر" مرتبط دانسته اند. نمونه متاخر جالبي از اين دست، شاعر ملي تركمن ماخموت قولي پراغي است كه در اشعار خويش از آزربايجان به شكل "خزه ربايجان" نام برده است. وي ميگويد: "من گزميشه م ائيران`ي، خزه ربايجان`ي". در فولكلور تركمني نيز از آزربايجان به شكل خزربجان و خزيربيجان ياد مي شود. از اين نمونه ها ارتباط نام آزربايجان با توركهاي باستاني خزه ر استنباط مي شود. علاوه بر اين، برخي از محققين، بر اين اعتقادند كه گاسپي و خزر هر دو نام يک واحد ائتنيك هستند که در سواحل شمال و شمال غربی دريايی که در زبانهاي گوناگون نامهای آنها را به خود گرفته، زندگی می کرده اند. اين محققين گاسپی و خزر هر دو را از ريشه گاس، خاس، خاز فوق الذكر دانسته و بر آنند که اين دو نام با افزوده شدن دو علامت جمع "پی" ايلامي و "ار" توركي به دو صورت مذکور در آمده اند. برخي از محققين نام "خيزير" پيغامبر افسانه اي –شخصيت ميتولوژيك كه در جهان تورك بنام وي دو عيد مردمي برگزار مي شود (خيدير نبي بايرامي و خيديرائللئز بايرامي) را نيز مرتبط با خزه رها و در نتيجه مرتبط با نام آزربايجان دانسته اند.

"ملت تورك آزر"، "قوم فارس آذري"

كلمه و تركيب "آذري ÂŻƏRÎ" هم به لحاظ املاء (داشتن ذال معجمهŻ )، هم به لحاظ دستور زبان (داشتن ياي نسبيت فارسي-عربي-Î )، هم به لحاظ تلفظ (تلفظ با "آ" ممدود فارسيÂ ) و هم به لحاظ مفهومي (ارتباط با آذر و آتش فارسي) تركيبي فارسي و غيرتوركي است. در املا توركي معاصر حرف و صداي "ذ" (ذال معجمهŻ ) و در زبان توركي معاصر علي القاعده صداي "آ ممدود Â" وجود ندارند. (براي الف ممدود فارسي و الف كوتاه توركي به بحث باي بك و بابك زيرين مراجعه كنيد). پسوند "ي-Î " در آخر كلمه نيز ياي نسبيت فارسي-عربي است. اين "ي" فارسي به شكل كشيده و ممدود "Î" ادا ميشود كه بر خلاف فونئتيك توركي كه در آن صرفا "ي" كوتاه "İ" وجود دارد است. البته عده اي از مدافعين توركي منشا بودن نام آزري، اين نام را داراي تركيب توركي "آز اري" به معني انسان آز و نه تركيب فارسي آزري به معني منسوب به آزر قبول مي كنند. اما اين نظريه مبتني بر حدس و گمان، غير منطقي و ناپذيرفتني است و از نظر لغوي هم قابل قبول نيست. چرا كه در زبان توركي تركيبات به شكل "نام قوم خاص+ اري"، به معني فردي منسوب به آن قوم خاص (تورك اري يعني فرد منسوب به قوم تورك)، و تركيبات به شكل "نام قوم خاص+ار" به معني ايل و يا گروه خاص بكار رفته است مانند تاتار به معني قوم تاتار و همه ديگر نامهاي اقوام تورك در تاريخ كه با تركيب ار ساخته شده اند (قاجار، افشار، ساوار- سووار- سابير، يازه ر -يازر- يازير، آجار - آجير، خزه ر- خزر، كنگر-كنگه ر، آوار-آپار، ماجار، ميشه ر، هونقار، بالخار- بالكار، خومار، بوله ر- بولقار- بلغار). تنها استثناء در اين مورد نام قوم آغاج اري است كه اين تركيب ويژه نه به معني فرد منسوب به قوم، بلكه به معني خود قوم بكار رفته است.

بدين ترتيب حتي اگر "آزر" به عنوان نام قومي تورك پذيرفته شود، تركيب "آذري" تركيبي صد در صد فارسي است و شايسته نيست براي ناميدن يك قوم و يا ملت تورك بويژه از طرف خود آن ملت و يا قوم تورك بكار رود. چنانچه در تاريخ نيز هرگز تركيبي فارسي براي ناميدن هيچ قوم تورك بويژه از طرف خود آن قوم بكار نرفته است. اين كه يك ملت نام ملي خود را به زبان ملت ديگري- آنهم زبان ملتي كه نخبگان و سياسيونش قصد محو و نابودي آن را دارند و عينا با نامي كه آنها براي وصول به اين مقصد از آن استفاده مي كنند يعني آذري- بنامد به جز بي هويتي، ناخودآگاهي ملي و بي احترامي به خود نام ديگري ندارد. كساني كه بخش آزر در نام آزربايجان را منسوب به قوم توركي "آز" و يا "آزر" (ويا قاسرها، يازرها، خزرها) مي دانند و طالبند كه اين نام را به جاي نام تاريخي ملت تورك در ايران و آزربايجان بكار برند شايسته مي بود كه اقلا در زبان فارسي آنرا به شكل "ملت آزر" (به جاي قوم آذري)، "آزرها" (به جاي آذريها)، "زبان آزري" (به جاي زبان آذري) و يا "توركي آزر" (به جاي تركي آذري) بكار برند. در زبان توركي نيز تركيبات مذكور ميبايست به شكل "آزر ميللتيAZƏR MİLLƏTİ " (به جاي آذري ميللتي)، "آزرلرAZƏRLƏR " (به جاي آذريلر)، "آزر ديليAZƏR DİLİ " (به جاي آذري ديلي)، "آزر توركجه سيAZƏR TÜRKCƏSİ " (به جاي آذري توركجه سي) و يا "آزرجهAZƏRCƏ " (به جاي آذريجه) بكار برده شوند. (تعويض نام ملي و تاريخي ملت ترك ساكن در آزربايجان و ديگر نقاط ايران و قفقاز با نامهاي ملي ساختگي مانند آذري و آذربايجاني، اقدامي بسيار نادرست و ضدملي است كه هم اكنون در جمهوري آزبايجان نيز طرفداراني پيدا كرده است. فرهنگيان و روشنفكران تورك مي بايد در مقابل اين تمايل و روند منحرف و ضد ملي به شدت مقاومت كنند)

"اورميه" به جاي "اروميه"

منابع فارسي، كردي و ارمني نام شهر اورمو (اورميه) را به شكل "اروميه" و منابع توركي و آزربايجاني اين نام را در زبان فارسي به شكل "اورميه" و به زبان توركي مطابق با تلفظ مردم به شكل "اورمو" مي نويسند. گروه دوم معتقد به توركي بودن نام اورمو و در نتيجه اورميه و همريشگي احتمالي آن با اسامي شهرهايي مانند اور و اوروك (از تمدن سومري)، اورگنج (دو شهر در ازبكستان و تركمنستان) و اورومچي (در تركستان چين، بئش پاليق سابق) اند.

تئوري سومري نام اورميه: مدافعين اين تئوري، نام اورميه را به شكل "اور(و)+ مو" (URU+MU)و يا "اور(و)+مه" (URU+ME) تقطيع مي كنند.

١- "اوروURU " در زبان سومري كه از طرف عده اي زباني خويشاوند با زبان توركي و يا پروتوتورك در نظر گرفته مي شود، به معني شهر و آبادي است. نام دو عدد از مهمترين شهرهاي سومري "اور" (المقير فعلي در جنوب بغداد) و "اوروك" (ورقه فعلي) بوده و احتمال داده مي شود نام كشور عراق نيز يادگار كلمه اوروك سومري باشد. (اوروق و يا اوروغ در تركي به معني قبيله و يا گروه انساني خويشاوند و در تركي معاصر به شكل اويروق به معني تابعيت و شهروندي است).

٢- "موMU " در زبان سومري (معادل شامو در زبان آكادي) به معني بهشت و يا بخشي از آسمان-بهشتها و شايد به معني باران است. "مهME " نيز در اين زبان به معني معيارها و نرمهاي فرهنگي و يا پرچمها و نشانه هاي اين نرمها مي باشد. بنابراين "اوروموURUMU " به زبان سومري به معني "شهر بهشتي"، "شهر باران" و "اورومهURUME " به معني "شهر فرهنگ، شهر بافرهنگ" مي باشد. نام اورومو به معني شهري بهشتي با باور رايج در ادوار باستان مبني بر قرار داشتن باغ عدن در آزربايجان –تبريز همخواني تمام دارد.

تئوري اورال –آلتائيك نام اورميه: در زبانهاي مخلتف اورال-آلتائيك نامهاي جغرافي متعدد مشابه با نام اورميه وجود دارند. اين نامها را ميتوان به دو دسته جداگانه، يكي با معاني مكان و مقر و ديوار و ديگري با معاني زيبا و شاد و شوق و ... تقسيم كرد:

١- بن "اورUR " در زبان توركي باستان به معني مكان و مقر و... و "اٶرو-هٶروÖRÜ-HÖRÜ " به معني ديوار درهم تنيده است. ("اورUR " به سومري به معني انسان است). كلمات اورتا (وسط)، اوردو (قرارگاه خاقان و ارتش)، اورون (مقام، مكان)، اورناماق (جاي گرفتن)، اورلاتما (اسكان دادن)،... در زبان توركي و بنا به شماري از صاحبنظران كلمات يورد و يا يئر نيز از همين ريشه اند.

٢- در زبانهاي اورال-آلتائيك تركيبات متعددي وجود دارند كه يادآور نام اورميه اند. در همه اين نامها معاني شادي، زيبائي، ذوق و شوق و الهام بخشي مستتر است:
الف- در زبانهاي مونقولي كلمات اورماURMA ، اورامURAM ، اورمانURMAN ، اورماسURMAS ، اورمURM ، اوروما URUMUو .... به معاني روحيه، الهام، شوق و ذوق ميباشند. نام شهر اورومچي URUMÇİ ويا اورونچي URUNÇİاويغورستان (تركستان چين) نيز كلمه اي مونقولي (لهجه باستاني مربوط به دو هزار سال پيش) است. در اين تركيب اورو URU به معني زيبا و مچي MÇİ به معني مرغزار و كشتزار است.
ب- در زبانهاي اوراليك (فينو اوگوريك مخصوصا در زبان مجاري) اٶرٶم-اٶرٶل ÖRÖM-ÖRÖLبه معني شادي و نشاط است (زبانشناسان اين نامها را ماخوذ از زبان توركي دانسته اند).
ج- در توركي باستان، اورينÖRİN, ÜRİN ، اورون ÜRÜN و اورگونÜRGÜN همه به معني شاد و شاداب بودن.

بنابر اين نظريه، نام اورميه كلمه اي اورال آلتائي به معني مكان زيبا و شادي بخش است.

تئوري تلفظ مردمي: عده اي نيز نام اورميه را ناشي از تلفظ توركي "روميه" و يا "رومي" ميشمارند. طبق اين نظر، از آنجائيكه صداي "ر" در اول كلمات اصيل توركي نمي آيد، براي رفع اين صدا از اول اين چنين كلمات وارده از زبانهاي خارجي، صداي "او" و يا "اي" به اول آنها (مانند ايره حيم به جاي رحيم و .....) افزوده مي شود. چنانچه واژه هاي "روم" و "روس" در توركي مردمي به شكل "اوروم" و "اوروس" تلفظ ميشوند. نام شهر "اورفا" در تركيه نيز طبق همين قاعده و از افزودن صداي "او" به اول نام قديمي اين شهر "روبا" حاصل شده است.

نام دومين شهر آزربايجان اورمو-اورميه، چه از ريشه توركي- اورال آلتائيك اروم-اورون، چه از تلفظ توركي "روميه" و چه از ريشه سومري اورومو-اورومه گرفته شده باشد، شكل "اورميه" مانند خود اين شهر، داراي بار و هويت توركي است و شايسته است كه در زبان فارسي نيز به جاي فرم غيرتوركي اروميه بكار رود.

"باي بكBAYBƏK " توركي به جاي "بابكBÂBƏK " فارسي

در باره مليت و تبار "باي بك" قهرمان آزربايجاني ميان فارسان و توركان مناقشه اي وجود دارد. گروه نخست وي را ايراني تبار و حتي فارس و گروه دوم او را تورك مي پندارند. اين مناقشه به ريشه يابي نام وي نيز سرايت كرده است. گروه نخست نام وي را به شكل بابك نگاشته، با الف ممدود و يا فارسي Â تلفظ ميكند و از ريشه پاپك ايراني مي داند، حتي برخي از ايشان گامي فراتر نهاده و بين نام پاپك و آزربايجان به شكل آتورپاپكان ارتباط برقرار كرده اند، در حاليكه گروه دوم نام وي را به شكل "باي بك" توركي نگاشته و با الف توركي و يا كوتاه A تلفظ مي كند.

تبار و مليت اين شخصيت تاريخي و ريشه يابي نام وي هر چه باشد، فرم "بابكBÂBƏK " كه با الف ممدود و كشيده ادا مي شود، ظاهر و هويتي فارسي و غيرتوركي دارد. در زبان توركي معاصر صداي الف كشيده وجود ندارد و تنها در مواردي بسيار استثنائي در كلمات وارده از زبانهاي خارجي مانند فارسي و عربي (تاريخTÂRİX ، جاويدCÂVİD ، آيت ÂYƏT، عاديÂDİ ، عالي ÂLİ... ) حفظ شده و بكار مي رود. الف كشيده در اينگونه كلمات عموما طبق فونئتيك زبان توركي به شكل كوتاه تلفظ ميشود، مانند بازار فارسي BÂZÂR كه به شكل بازارBAZAR تلفظ مي گردد. وجود الف كشيده در اين قبيل كلمات علامت و دليلي آشكار بر فارسي و غيرتوركي بودن اين كلمات است. تلفظ نام بابك با الف كشيده فارسي در زبان توركي، علاوه بر اذعان به فارسي و غيرتوركي بودن اين نام، بي اعتنائي آشكار به فونئتيك زبان توركي است. در زبان توركي نيز مانند هر زبان زنده ديگر نامهاي اشخاص بويژه نامهاي شخصيتهاي تاريخي مي بايست بر اساس قواعد و فونئتيك زبان توركي نگاشته و تلفظ شوند. چنانچه به عنوان نمونه نام آدم، قرايوسف، خضر، محمود، اسماعيل و.... در زبان توركي به شكل آدام، قارايوسوف، خيدير، ماحميد، ايسماعيل و ... نوشته و تلفظ ميشوند. در اين مورد نيز، مي بايست اين نام در زبان توركي:
- يا با الف كوتاه به شكل BABƏK تلفظ گردد (كه احدي از توركان بنا به ضرورتهاي قانون هماهنگي اصوات آنرا چنين تلفظ نمي كند)،
- يا بنا به قانون هماهنگي اصوات به "باباك-باباق" (BABAK-BABAQ - مانند تبديل آدم عربي به آدام توركي) و يا "ببه ك" (BƏBƏK- مانند تبديل "حياط" عربي به "حه يه ط" توركي) تبديل گردد (هيچكدام از دو فرم باباك-باباق و ببه ك در زبان توركي به عنوان اسم شخص بكار نرفته اند)،
- و يا با افزودن "ي" به الف كوتاه به شكل "باي بك BAYBƏK " تلفظ گردد. (الف ممدود به ديفتونگ آي تبديل شود)

في الواقع اين شكل اخير يعني "باي بك" شكلي است كه در ميان توركان از ديرباز (توركان باستاني بولغار) و امروز نيز (توركان معاصر تاتار، تركيه، آلتاي، تووا،....) به عنوان اسم شخص رايج است. در اين نام و فرم توركي، "باي" به معني غني، ثروتمند و محتشم؛ "بك" به معني امير، عاليرتبه، بزرگ و ... و كل نام تركيبي "باي بك" به معني امير محتشم است (براي اطلاعات بيشتر در معاني باي و بك به تئوري آز+ار+باي+قان مراجعه كنيد).

"قاشقاي" و "قاراي" به جاي "قشقائي" و "قرائي"

همانگونه كه در باره ماهيت فارسي تركيب آذري گفته شد، تركيبات قشقائي (نام بزرگترين اتحاديه ايلي دياسپوراي توركان آزربايجاني ساكن در ايران) و نيز ايل قرائي، هويتي فارسي دارد. در هر دوي اين نامها "ي" نسبيت فارسي به نام ايلي تورك افزوده شده و تركيب فارسي حاصل به جاي نام اصلي ايل بكار رفته است. اين سبك از آنجا كه نام اين ايل را از كلمه اي توركي (قاشقاي، قاراي) به تركيبي فارسي (قشقائي، قرائي) تغيير مي دهد كاملا نادرست است. قشقايي و قرايي (نه قشقائي و قرائي) تنها مي تواند به هنگام اشاره پديده اي منسوب به اين دو طائفه تورك در زبان فارسي بكار روند و نه به جاي نام آنها، مانند شعراي قشقايي (به معني شعراي قاشقايها، آداب قرايي به معني آداب قارايها و ...). علاوه بر آن حرف "ئ" در الفباي توركي صرفا صداي كسره مي دهد و كار برد آن به جاي حرف "ي" در كلمات توركي ناشايست است. با تفاصيل فوق نگارش صحيح نام اين دو طائفه توركي، قاشقاي و قاراي (به جاي قشقائي و قرائي) است.

فارسي (FARS, FARSI) و پارسي (PERS, PERSIAN)

قوم فارس و زبان فارسي، با اقوام و زبان باستاني پرس، پارس، پارسي و پرشين عينيت و رابطه مستقيمي ندارد. ايندو٬ به لحاظ زباني، ديني، تبار-نژادي و فرهنگي دو آنتيته تماما جداگانه اند. پارسي، زباني ايراني باستاني و منقرض شده است؛ پارسها قومي از ايراني زبانهاي باستانند كه مدتها قبل از آنكه از صحنه روزگار حذف شوند به دين زرتشتي در آمده بودند. تبار پارسهاي باستان نيز آميخته اي از اينديك و مونقولوئيد (فيزيوتيپي شبيه هنديان امروزي) بوده است. (شايد بتوان پارسييان زرتشتي مهاجرت كرده به شبه جزيره هندوستان را باقيمانده پارسيان باستان به شمار آورد٬ البته عده اي اين تئوري را نيز رد نموده اند). در حاليكه زبان و خلق و مذهب فارس امروزه پديده هائي جديد و كاملا نوظهور در ايران اندּ

توده فارس زبان امروزي ايران از هر جنبه بين قرون ١٦-٢٠ و در دوره صفوي- قاجار- پهلوي فرم امروزي را به خود گرفته است. اين خلق با تركيب نژادي-تباري٫ فرهنگ و مذهب امروزي آن گروهي نامتجانس و نوظهور است. فارسها به لحاظ ‌نژادي گروهي ناهمگن مركب از رگه هاي مديترانه اي پروپر٬ مونقولوئيد٬ اينديك و حتي نئگروئيد ميباشند. قوم فارس امروزين به لحاظ تباري تركيبي از اكثريت بوميان باستان غيرايراني منطقه، بازماندگان منسوب به پرسها و ديگر اقوام مهاجر ايراني زبان (عمدتا از شرق٬ از افغانستان كنوني)، بوميان و مهاجرين تورك (از شرق٬ از شمال و از غرب)، بوميان و مهاجرين عرب و سامي (عمدتا از جنوب غربي) است. بنابراين گروههاي مختلف فارس زبان ساكن در ايران كه امروزه با نام قوم فارس از آنها ياد ميشود در حقيقت ملقمه اي از گروههاي مخلتف تباري و زباني اند كه به مرور زمان با غلبه زبان فارسي دري دربارها و شاعران و مهاجرين افغانستاني، پذيرش علايق مذهبی توركان غلات قزلباش آزربايجاني و تركيه اي به شكل دگرگون و فارسي شده شيعه امامي و اخذ مظاهر فرهنگي٬ آداب و سنن٬ جشنها و اعياد و خط از اعراب و بوميان و توركان و مهاجران ايراني زبان ديگر به صورت قوم فارس (زبان) پا به عرصه وجود گزارده اند. حتي مذهب شيعه امامي كه يكي از اساسي ترين ستونهاي هويتي قوم فارس امروز را تشكيل ميدهد٫ نيز در سايه توركان قزلباش آزربايجان و تركيه به مذهب ملي قوم فارس تبديل شده است. توركها از اين جهت نقشي بي بديل در بوجود آمدن خلق فارس بازي نموده اند.

زبان فارسي امروزي و رايج در ايران با ۶۰٪-۸۰٪ كلمات عربي، زباني ژارگون-كرئول (jargon-kreol)مانند اوردو است. اين زبان آميخته اي از زبانهاي ايراني وارد شده به داخل مرزهاي كنوني ايران كه منشاشان در افغانستان و تاجيكستان كنوني قرار دارد با ديگر زبانهاي ايراني غيرفارسي (سغدي، خوارزمي و راجي و ּּּ)٬ زبان عربي٬ توركي و ديگر زبانهاي بومي ايران است.

كاربرد پرشين-پارسي براي قوم و زبان فارسي٬ قائل شدن به خلوص تباري و نژادي فارس زبانهاي امروزي و يا اعتقاد به پاكي و عدم اختلاط اقوام پارسي باستان در طول دو هزار سال گذشته؛ ناديده گرفتن تاريخ و فعل و انفعالات دو هزار ساله٬ تحريف آن و گفتماني پان ايرانيستي- نژادپرستانه براي ايجاد سابقه و هويتي تاريخي براي اين گروه زباني نوظهور و تصاحب هويت و ميراث تاريخي پارسها توسط فارس زبانان امروزي است. يكي نشان دادن خلق نوظهور فارس با تركيب نژادي و مولفه هاي هويتي فرهنگي و مذهبي ويژه اش، با اقوام پرس باستاني از بي اساسترين جعليات افسانه سازان دولتي فارس در تاريخ ميباشد. در ايران امروز نه زباني به اسم پارسي و نه قومي به اسم پارس و يا "پرشين" وجود ندارد، بنابر اين ميبايست اكيدا از بكار بردن نامهاي پارس و پرس و پرشين به جاي فارس و فارسي بويژه در زبان انگليسي اجتناب نمود.

جعفري و شيعه (امامي)

يكي از مهمترين ناآگاهيها ويا بدآگاهيا در باره ملت تورك ساكن در ايران، آزربايجان و عراق، يكي انگاشتن مذهب اين ملت با مذهب قوم فارس است. اين يگانگي و اشتراك مذهبي فرضي و غيرواقعي توركها و فارسها، از طرف دولت ايران و قوميتگرايان فارس به عنوان يكي از اساسي ترين ابزارهاي آسيميلاسيون ملت تورك در قوم و فرهنگ فارس بكار مي رود. حال آنكه ديرزماني است در عالم و تاريخ تشيع – اقلا در سطح مردمي و معتقدان و مومنين- دو قرائت كاملا متفاوت توركي و فارسي-عربي از شيعه دوازده امامي (اثني عشري) به ترتيب به نامهاي جعفري و امامي (و يا مختصرا شيعه، شيعي) فرم گرفته است. در گذشته- و امروز در جامعه فارس- فرق بين جعفري و شيعه امامي دانسته نبود و ايندو اغلب مترادف يكديگر و يا حتي به شكل مذهب جعفري امامي بكار ميرفتند. اما امروزه به طور روز افزوني تناظر و عينيتي بين شيعه، شيعه امامي و امامي از سويي و بين هر سه اينها و فارسيت و قوميتگرائي فارسي از سوي ديگر ايجاد شده است. به طوريكه هرجا كه شيعه و يا امامي گفته مي شود مراد صرفا شيعه امامي فارسي و نه فرم توركي آن يعني جعفري است.

مذهب شيعه و يا امامي مذهبي است كه فارسها و برخي ديگر از اقوام ايراني زبان منسوب به آن ميباشند. قرائت امامي كه قرائت فارسي -عربي شيعه دوازده امامي اورتودوكس است، به شدت متاثر از آئينهاي ايراني باستان مانند زرتشتيگري است و در همسوئي با آن بر اصل معصوميت امامان و ولايت طبقه روحانيت شكل گرفته و در آن صنف روحاني و مجتهد از قدرت، اهميت و قداست ويژه اي حتي عصمت برخوردار است. در مذهب شيعه (امامي) اختلاط دو نهاد دين و دولت و حاكميت و تسلط صنف روحاني بر حكومت و دولت، اصلي اساسي است. اين مذهب همان است كه در تاريخ معاصر در برخي از شخصيتهاي فارس مانند ملامحمد باقر مجلسي، فضل الله نوري، مدرس، كاشاني، بروجردي، حائري، نواب صفوي، خميني، خزئلي، مطهري، مصباح ‌يزدى، طبسى، جنتى، خاتمي، عسكراولادى، شريعتي، رجوي٬ پيمان٬ سروش، رفسنجاني، خامنه اي... مجسم شده است. تبعيض گسترده بر عليه زنان و تلقي انسان درجه دوم بودن آنها، باز در همسوئي با آئينهاي باستاني ايراني و زرتشتي (مانند سنن ايراني-زرتشتي چادر، تعدد زوجات، صيغه، پست و ناپاك شمردن ذاتي زنان)، از مشخصات اصلي مذهب شيعه (امامي) فارسي است.

مذهب جعفري نيز مذهبي است كه امروزه توركهاي شيعي ايران٬ خاورميانه و قفقاز، در تركيه، ايران، آزربايجان و عراق بر آنند و خود را منسوب به آن ميدانند. چهارچوب قرائت توركي مذهب جعفري توسط نادرشاه افشار مشخص شده است. اين مذهب ابتدائا همان مذهب شيعه امامي بود كه وي آنرا به سطح يك مذهب فقهي مستقل تنزل داده است:

١- مذهب جعفري، به عنوان مذهب حقه پنجم اهل سنت و جماعت، در فروعات مقلد طريقه و اجتهاد امام جعفر صادق است.
٢- در مذهب جعفري مسجد و دين حوزه اي شخصي بوده و مي بايد از در هم آميزي مسجد- دين و دولت اجتناب نمود.
٣- در مذهب جعفري، از امهات مذهب شيعه مانند ولايت و عصمت امامان و روحانيون خبري نيست.
٤- در مذهب جعفري، صنف خادمان دين (معادل صنف روحاني و يا روحانيت در مذهب شيعه امامي) فاقد قداست و امتيازات ويژه بوده، عنصر مركزي نيست.
٥- بنا به اين مذهب، صنف خادمان دين مطلقا ميبايست تحت كنترل حكومت عرفي و غيرديني لائيك عمل نمايد.
٦- حوزه عمل خادمان ديني منحصرا محدود به مسائل عبادي و خدمات فقهي است. اين گروه حق و صلاحيت دخالت در امور حكومتي و دولتي را ندارد.
٧- در مذهب جعفري نظريه ولايت فقيه، پارسيگري افراطي روحانيون طراز اول فارس و غير آن، بدعت شمرده مي شودند.
٨- در مذهب جعفري، همسو با اسلام مردمي و فرهنگ توركي، برابري زن و مرد اصلي اساسي است.

اكنون توركهاي آزربايجاني تركيه و جمهوري آزربايجان بدرستي خود را جعفري ناميده و بعضا با اصرار به امامي نبودن خود و به متفاوت بودن مذهب خويش از مذهب شيعيان امامي (فارس و عرب) تاكيد مي كنند و بدرستي ادعا مي نمايند كه صرفا جعفري بوده و شيعي (به معني امامي فارس) نمي باشند. اين روند تمايز و تبرا از شيعه در ميان توركان، پس از تاسيس جمهوري اسلامي در ايران و به حاكميت رسيدن نظريه بدعت آميز ولايت فقيه، آميخته شدن حاكميت روحانيون شيعي امامي فارس در ايران با قوميت گرايي افراطي فارسي، باستانگرائي پارسي و آريائيگري نژادپرستانه، اتفاق استراتژيك و همه جانبه بنيادگرايان و روحانيت طراز اول شيعي فارس با نيروهاي ضدتوركي - ضدشيعي- ضداسلامي ارمني، يوناني، روسي و چيني بر عليه توركان، تضييقات گسترده بر عليه فرهنگ و سنن توركي و از جمله تضييق حقوق زنان و گسترش تصويري بسيار ناخوشايند از اين رژيم فارسگرا در ميان توركان منطقه تشديد شده است.

با توجه به نكات فوق و از آنجا كه بين دو قرائت جعفري توركان و شيعي فارس-عربي تفاوتهاي ماهوي بويژه در عرصه هاي سياسي و اجتماعي وجود دارد، مي بايد از يكي انگاشتن مذهب دو ملت تورك و فارس و مخصوصا شيعه ناميدن توركان ايران و آزربايجان اجتناب كرد. توركان آزربايجان و ايران بر مذهب جعفري و فارسها بر مذهب شيعه اند.

"توركجه" (TÜRKCƏ) و "توركچه" (TÜRKÇE)

ملل تورك و يا مللي كه زبانهايشان در خانواده زبانهاي توركي قرار مي گيرد همه داراي نام ملي مخصوص به خود مانند تركمن، تاتار، اويغور، قيرقيز، اوزبك، قزاق و ... اند. در ميان اين ملل دو ملت هستند كه داراي نام ملي تاريخي مشترك به شكل "ترك" و يا "تورك" مي باشند. اينها ملت تورك ساكن در ايران-آزربايجان-عراق و ملت تورك ساكن در تركيه-قبرس-شبه جزيره بالكان است. مساله نامگذاري اين دو ملت خويشاوند و زبانشان كه هر دو لهجه يك زبان واحد به نام توركي هستند همواره معضلي بوده است. در غرب تمايلي وجود دارد كه زبان گروه اول را تركي آزربايجاني، آزربايجاني و يا آزري و زبان گروه دوم را به نام تركي بنامند.

اين مشكل در زبان توركي نيز وجود دارد. اخيرا يكي از نويسندگان تورك (سايت-وئبلاق تورك دونياسي) راه حلي بسيار بديع و قطعي براي رفع اين مشكل پيشنهاد كرده است. او اين دو نام را به همان شكلي كه متكلمين بدانها خود آنها را مي نامند، ناميده است، يعني تركي آزربايجاني را به شكل توركجه (TÜRKCƏ) و تركي تركيه را به شكل توركچه (TÜRKÇE). بدين ترتيب مساله نامگذاري اين دو لهجه بسيار نزديك زبان توركي اقلا در زبان توركي به طور قطعي حل خود را يافته است.

"توركمان" (TÜRKMAN-TURCOMAN) و "تركمن" (TÜRKMEN-TURKMEN)

توركمان و تركمن دو ائتنونيم با ريشه مشترك اما معاني و مصاديق مخلتف اند. تركمن (جمع عربي آن تراكمه) نام ملتي از ملل تورك ساكن در جمهوري تركمنستان در آسياي ميانه و برخي نواحي پيرامون آن است. زبان اين ملت جزء شاخه شرقي توركي اوغوزي است. اما توركمان كه جمع عربي آن تركمه است، ائتنونيمي مربوط به توركان آزربايجاني است. زبان همه گروههاي تاريخي و يا معاصر داراي نام توركمان، جزء شاخه شرقي توركي اوغوزي غربي يعني توركي آزربايجاني است. نام توركمان در تاريخ و عصر حاضر دو معني مشخص داشته است. توركمان به لحاظ تاريخي نام گروهي ائتنوقرافيك (ايل واحد و يا ايلات متعدد) از تركان آزربايجاني است. گروههاي آزربايجاني قزلباش در آسياي صغير-خاورميانه بويژه آن ايلاتي كه بر عليه دولت عثماني قيام ننموده اند، براي تمايز بين خويش و تركمنهاي همتبار و هم ريشه ساكن در آسياي ميانه، خود را توركمان ميناميده اند. در منابع تاريخي، دولتهاي تاسيس شده توسط اين گروهها مانند دول تورك-آزربايجاني قاراقويونلو، آغ قويونلو، صفوي، افشار و قاجار با نام دولتهاي توركمان شناخته ميشوند. اما منابع فارسي اين دولتهاي توركي- آزربايجاني توركمان و ايلات موسس آنها را به منظور نقي هويت توركي و آزربايجاني ايشان به نادرستي و عمدا تركمن مي خوانند.

ائتنونيم توركمان در كاربرد معاصر به منظور ناميدن دياسپوراي تركان آزربايجاني در كشورهاي عربي عراق، سوريه، لبنان، اردن و بخشهائي از تركيه بكار مي رود. هرچند به جاي اين نام كه منحصرا در مورد دياسپوراي تركان آزربايجاني در كشورهاي عربي بكار ميرود بهتر است نام تورك بكار برده شود. نام مربوط تركمه نيز نام واحد ائتنيك مشخصي متعلق به توركان آزربايجاني در قفقاز، ايران و شرق تركيه است. با توجه به آنچه كه گفته شد به هنگام اشاره به دياسپوراي توركان آزربايجاني در عراق و ... و همچنين شخصيتها، ايلات و دولتهاي آق قويونلو، قاجار، افشار، صفوي و ... آن مي بايد از فرم توركمان استفاده نمود و شكل تركمن را منحصرا براي ملت ساكن در تركمنستان و نواحي پيرامون آن بكار برد.

"مونقول" (MONGOL)، "موغول" (MOĞUL-MOGHUL) و "موغال" (MUĞAL-MUGHAL)

در قرون ١٤ و ١٥ ميلادي دول و خاندانهاي موغولي ايلخاني (جلايري)، هلاكوئي (ايلكاني)، چوباني، اينجوئي، قوتلوق خاني (قاراخيتاي)، جغتائي (چاغاتاي)، آلتين اوردا، موغال .... در ايران، هندوستان و كل آوراسيا در توده ترك و فرهنگ تركي استحاله يافته بودند. از اين سبب و به منظور تاكيد بر بينونيت اين دو گروه، گروههاي موغولي اصيل خويشتن را "مونغول" و بخش ترك شده ايشان خود را در اوراسيا مغول، موغول و در هندوستان موغال ناميده اند.

منابع فارسي فرقي بين مونقولهاي ترك شده يعني "موغول"ها و گروه اصلي "مونقول" باقيمانده نمي گذارند و در نتيجه و به خطا دولتهاي تورك و آزربايجاني مانند ايلخانيان، چوپانيان و غيره را دولتهائي مغول (به معني مونقول) مي نامند. حال آنكه زبان مادري اغلب منسوبين خاندان و سران اين دولتهاي موغولي تاسيس شده در آزربايجان، توركي آزربايجاني بوده و در حيات اجتماعي و سياسي روزمره خود نيز منحصرا متكلم به اين زبان بوده اند. در ميان اين گروه اصلا مونقولي تماما تورك شده يعني موغولها، تعداد اشخاصي كه هنوز به زبان مونقولي آشنائي داشته باشند، انگشت شمار بوده اند. برخي از سلاطين موغول در ايران، آسياي ميانه و هندوستان خدمات بسيار ارزنده و ماندگاري به فرهنگ، زبان و ادبيات توركي نموده اند. از اين جمله است سولطان احمد اووئيس اوغلو غياث الدين بهادر جالايير (١٤١٠-١٣٨٢) سلطاني فرهيخته از خاندان توركي آزربايجاني جلايري و يا ايلخاني با حاكمان اوليه مونقول، كه در سير زمان تماما به دولتي آزربايجاني و توركي تبديل شده است. وي كه موسيقي شناس، سخنور، مذهب، نقاش و خاتم بندي برجسته بود، ديوان شعر بسيار ارزشمند و مهمي به زبان توركي آزربايجاني دارد.

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Friday, April 27, 2007


Iran: Stifling the Azeri minority
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Karl Rahder, AMH, ISN
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Trouble is brewing in Iran's 'Southern Azerbaijan' as the government targets Azeri human rights activists and cracks down on what some view as the Azeri ethnic minority's struggle for more democracy and human rights, and what others call separatism.

Editor's Note: This is Part II of a two-part series on Iran's Azerbaijani minority. Part I was published on 19 April 2007.

By Karl Rahder for ISN Security Watch (26/04/07)

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been both tempestuous and guardedly cordial at least as far back as the Soviet period, when Moscow refused to withdraw its troops from Iran after World War II, one of the first incidents that defined the emerging Cold War. The Kremlin ultimately pulled out, abandoning its hope of exploiting Azeri-Persian tensions and enlarging the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic to encompass much of northern Iran.

Like much of the post-colonial world, the demographics in both Iran and Azerbaijan make little sense. The Araz River marks the border that was delimited after an 1828 treaty between Iran and imperial Russia, and separates Azerbaijan's eight million Azeris (along with small ethnic minorities of Russians, Lezgins and others) and the much larger Azeri population in Iran.

Despite at least some Iranian success in recruiting agents in Azerbaijan, a trip across the Araz River into northern Iran leads one to a region of simmering discontent - a place where hundreds of thousands of Azeri demonstrators have clashed with riot police in what began as a series of protests against Persian institutional racism but lately may have morphed into something much broader and more dangerous.

The cockroach conundrum
The catalyst for the riots that spread across northern Iran last year was the publication in late May of a children's cartoon in a newspaper controlled by the Iranian government. The cartoon, in color and taking up an entire page, depicts the travails of a child who attempts to communicate with a cockroach - a thinly veiled surrogate for an Azeri. The child queries the cockroach in a variety of languages, but the uncomprehending insect merely replies with the Azeri word for "pardon me?"

The parallels between an illiterate cockroach and Azeris were not lost on Iran's Azeri population, who responded with a wave of protests in Tabriz, Orumiyeh and other cities. Initial reports from Azeri sources indicated that at least four people were killed by Iranian riot police, but subsequent estimates have put the number of dead at up to 100.

As a result of the unrest, during which cars were torched and a bank set ablaze in Tabriz, the authorities took the opportunity to round up Azeri human rights activists such as Abbas Lisani, who was arrested in June of 2006 after the demonstration in Ardebil. Lisani was convicted for "spreading anti-government propaganda," and sentenced to a year and a half in prison and 50 lashes.

As of late January, Lisani had ended a month-long hunger strike and was reported to be weakened and in ill-health.

Lisani has been targeted frequently by Iranian prosecutors over the past several years. In 2004, he was reportedly severely beaten by Iranian police during an arrest in a mosque in Ardebil. According to recent press reports, Lisani's next trial date will be on 17 May in Tabriz.

Other Iranian Azeris, such as liberal cleric Hojjatoleslam Ezimi Qedimi, had been convicted of similar crimes prior to last year's cartoon controversy. Qedimi was released last August, but is forbidden to speak publicly on Azeri rights issues and to wear the clothes of a religious scholar.

After demonstrations in February this year, as many as 60 Azeris were arrested in the city of Orumiye, including journalist Esmail Javadi, who was jailed in an Intelligence Ministry facility and "severely beaten," according to Amnesty International.

Some 20 people were arrested in the city of Ardebil in late February, including human rights activist Ramin Sadeghi who reportedly was being held in Ardebil prison. Like Lisani, Sadeghi had gone on a hunger strike and "is believed to be in poor health and in urgent need of medical care," said Amnesty International in early March. Journalist Said Metinpour was arrested in Zenjan, and was said "to have blood on his lips" during his arrest. As of press time, all three men had been released on bail and were awaiting trial.

"Greater Azerbaijan"
One former political prisoner now lives in the US and leads the Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM), an organization that focuses on Azeri rights in Iran.

Mahmudali Chehregani, a former literature professor, enjoys considerable prestige among Azeri Iranians and has been consulted by officials in the Pentagon, the State Department and even the White House in recent years - talks that have fueled speculation that the US administration hopes to take advantage of ethnic unrest in Iran.

Cherhraganli is often referred to as a separatist, although in a recent interview with ISN Security Watch in Washington, DC, he was careful to distance himself from the concept of an independent southern Azerbaijani state or unification with the Azerbaijani Republic.

"We want only democracy and human rights. And we want a change in the Iranian regime to a democratic and secular government. We favor a federal Iran, the same as federalism in the US or Germany. We want self-determination. We want Tabriz to be the capital of south Azerbaijan, and we want a parliament and a government. But we are a part of Iran. We are not separatists," he said.

Even if a separatist uprising is remote, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a lot to be nervous about, some say.

"If you're an Iranian politician, you have a major problem with the Azeri minority," said Stephen Blank, "and you have a constant fear that that minority can be used by outside forces to stir up trouble within Iran […] Iranians today are very conscious of this fact. It's a big problem for them domestically."

Most western analysts and even many Azeris believe that the prospects for a "Greater Azerbaijan" are slim.

Etibar Mammadov is one of the skeptics. He points out that even if an opportunity for southern Azerbaijan to merge with the Azerbaijani Republic were to present itself, the cultural differences between secular Azerbaijan and the Azeri region of Iran would be too wide to resolve in a unified state, even though both groups share a common Shi'ite religious faith.

Iran's Azeris, more conservative and far more numerous than their kin north of the river, would be reluctant to accept rule from Baku, he says. "The Iranian Azeris would ask, 'We are 25 million and they are only eight million. Why should we follow Baku's rules? Why shouldn't they follow our rules?'"

Obali is convinced that the movement is undergoing a shift in emphasis from a protest against Persian racism to a wider anti-regime struggle, and once that happens, he says, "the whole character of the movement changes. And now the Iranian government has to take notice, so the problems for them have been multiplied in the past year or so."

For Obali, who sees Iran as an artificial state that is held together only by coercion from Tehran, the underlying issue is the centrifugal ethnic forces that could tear the country apart at the seams. An increasingly active Azeri rights movement, along with similar underground organizations in Baluchi, Kurdish and Arab regions of Iran, threaten the country's raison d'etre: a unified, multi-ethnic theocracy.

"The movement is so deep. And it's a popular, grass-roots movement. The government brought in close to 200,000 extra troops to handle it, and they couldn't do anything until it was too late […] We are the single most devastating news for the Iranian government!"

More trouble brewing
Further clashes between the clerical regime and Iran's ethnic minorities are very likely, given the history of ethnic grievances in northern Iran and elsewhere and rising tensions in the Persian Gulf, where a US naval task force was reinforced in late March.

Despite visits to northern Iran by President Ahmadinejad in recent months, ostensibly to rebuild support and reach out to the community, trouble with the Republic of Azerbaijan may also be brewing. An unknown number of Iranian military helicopters violated Azerbaijani airspace on 22 February, just a day after the demonstrations in northern Iran, causing widespread speculation in Azerbaijan that the incursion was an intentional message - although the Iranian government subsequently apologized and claimed the helicopters had strayed into Azerbaijan accidentally.

As of early April, Azerbaijan's Turan news agency reported that Iran had closed the border between the two countries, a report that the Iranian government denied.

Iran, then, is deeply concerned about the potential for instability inside its borders, and may be signaling neighboring Azerbaijan and its US ally that Tehran is firmly in control of its territory.

"The real question," Stephen Blank says, "is what is stronger - nationalism or Islamism? It's an open question and nobody has the answer."
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Karl Rahder has taught US foreign policy and international history at colleges and universities in the US and Azerbaijan. In 2004, he was a Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan with the Civic Education Project, an academic program funded by the Soros Foundations and the US Department of State. He is currently based in Chicago.

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Turkey-Iran relations, 2000-2001: The Caspian, Azerbaijan and the Kurds
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Robert Olson
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06/01/2002
Middle East Policy
111-129
Copyright (c) Middle East Policy Council Jun 2002

Relations between Turkey and Iran were dominated during 2000-2001 by issues relating to he Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and the Kurds. Geostrategically, the Kurdish question was the most important for Iran. The potential for an American attack on Iraq in cooperation with Turkey, and the dissolution of the Baathist regime in Baghdad - let alone a fragmented Iraq dependent on the United States for survival - gave Tehran cause to worry. In such a senario Tehran's geopolitical position in Iraq would weaken. Iran would remain a strong player, but Turkey's ability to project power as a player in Gulf politics would increase considerably. Its increased presence in Iraq could extend its military reach some 250 km south and east along the
Iraq-Iran border abutting the sensitive Kurdish and Azeri regions of Iran and enhance Turkey's role in Gulf politics.

Other ramifications would follow. Turkish presence in Iraqi Kurdistan would not only exacerbate the transnational aspects of the Kurdish question between regions in Iraq and Iran but also heighten tensions between Iranian Kurdistan and Tehran. Tensions and more border conflict in the north would detract from Iran's ability to project power into the Caspian Sea region. Such developments would reduce further Iran's already deteriorating position vis-a-- vis the bilateral delimitation agreements signed in 2001 by four of the riparian states - Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Tehran realized by the end of 2001 that, as a result of the events of September 11, Turkey's and Israel's relations with the United States had grown even closer. More ominous for Tehran, so had Russia's. By the end of 2001, Turkey had assumed a stronger position vis-a-vis Iran concerning the three issues discussed here. Furthermore, it seems likely that such developments will continue as a result of "America's war against terrorism," especially in Afghanistan, and Iran's non-- cooperation with some of the objectives of U.S. policies.


TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

At the beginning of 2000, relations remained stalemated. The Kurdish question continued to dominate relations. In late December 2000, Turkey once againsent a large force some 200 miles into northern Iraq to extricate the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from clashes with the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in which PUK forces were suffering defeats. The December fighting seems to have been initiated by PUK leader Jalal Talabani, who wanted to demonstrate to Turkey that he, like the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), could be a good ally, if not a trusted friend. By December it was clear to Talabani that he had to lessen his dependency on Iran if he hoped to mend fences with Turkey and improve relations with the KDP. The poor performance of PUK forces in their clashes with the PKK was partially responsible for Turkey's incursion. In the waning months of 2000, it was clear to Talabani that Tehran was also relying less upon the PUK as its proxy in northern Iraq. Throughout the last half of 2000, Iranian and KDP delegations visited back and forth between Tehran and Arbil, the capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). By the end of 2000, as the PUK continued to lose strength vis-a-- vis the KDP (a process that had begun in 1996), it became clear to Tehran that the PUK alone no longer effectively served Iran's geopolitical interests in northern Iraq. After 1996, Tehran began to increase its contacts with the KDP.

When the KDP released hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and officers they had captured in and around the town of Baadhra, its strength was unquestioned. By such a gesture, the KDP obviously was signaling that they thought the policies of their allies - Turkey, the United States and Israel - of trying to topple Saddam Hussein from power were shortsighted and would not be successful, at least not in the near term.

By the end of 2000, substantial changes had taken place in northern Iraq and in the KRG. The PUK recognized that it was the weaker organization and that it would have to get on the KDP bandwagon. This further weakened Iran's geopolitical posture and its ability to challenge Turkey's increasingly strong position in northern Iraq. The weakening of Iran's position in northern Iraq undoubtedly also made it clear to Tehran that Turkey would challenge Iran in the Caspian region and in Azerbaijan.

The struggle between the PUK and PKK continued into January 2001 before negotiations curtailed it. Tehran reportedly told Talabani that it could not tolerate this fighting, with the Turkish army in pursuit of the PKK and a substantial Turkish military and intelligence presence along its border with Iraq. This development occurred at the very time that Israeli aircraft, now based in Turkey, were flying reconnaisance flights along Iran's border with Turkey. In mid-- January, Tehran sent a large delegation to Sulamaniya, Talabani's stronghold and the captial of the PUK-controlled territory, to persuade the PUK of its concerns. Iran's leaning on Talabani seems to have had the desired effect of negotiations between the two warning Kurdish factions - the inevitable consequence of Iran's weakening position in northern Iraq. These developments signaled to Tehran that it would soon be challenged elsewhere by Turkey and its Israeli and American allies. It must have also been clear to Tehran that, if challenged in Azerbaijan, Iran would have to respond much more robustly than it did in northern Iraq during the last half of the 1990s.


2001: NEW DIRECTIONS?

Ankara and Tehran devoted much of January to sorting out relations with their respective Kurdish clients and allies in northern Iraq.2 The KDP and PUK tried to do the same, focusing on their respective relations with the PKK. In mid-January, Talabani appointed Baram Salih as the new prime minister of the PUK-controlled region in southern Iraqi Kurdistan after the resignation of Qusrat Rasul on January 14. Salih had long represented the PUK in Washington and had been involved in almost all of the negotiations concerning Iraq, Turkey and Iran for more than a decade. He was one of the architects of the Washington Agreement signed on September 17, 1998. In spite of his earlier stance for the independence of Kurdistan and opposition to the PUK's cooperation with Turkey in fighting against the PKK, his acceptance of the prime ministership seemed to indicate his willingness to accept Talabani's plan to cooperate more closely with Turkey and the KDP against the PKK. In the subsequent months he followed this policy. It seems that one of the reasons for Talabani's changed position was that the PKK, with Iran's help, had entrenched itself at the northern end of the Qandil mountains that rise along the Iraq-- Iran border behind the town of Raniya. From this position, the PKK could attack Raniya and Qalat Diza, both situated on the road to Sulaymaniya.3

Talabani was no doubt upset further with reports that the PKK had organized a local administration near the Raniya-Rawanduz region in PUK-- controlled territory. Iranian Kurdish members of parliament harshly condemned Talabani's "being partner to Ankara's liquidation plans against the PKK."4

Other developments distracted from bilateral relations until late July, when the Azerbaijan crisis broke out. The principal developments were a series of corruption scandals in Turkey encompassing energy, gas and oil pipelines, and banking and financial sectors. The number and extent of the scandals were emphasized by their code names: Hurricane, Matador, Parachute, Storm, Harvest, Buffalo, Strike and Dirty Curtain, the last dealing with corruption in the government-subsidized theater system.5 The collapse of the Turkish economy in February induced the most severe economic crisis of the post-World War II period. While the crisis was somewhat eased by huge World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) grants totaling $16.1 billion by early summer 2001, the severe consequences of the IMF-- imposed reform program and the possibility of social unrest preoccuppied politicians, bureaucrats and the TAF alike up to the Azerbaijan crisis of July 23.

Tehran was also busy during the first six months of 2001 with the continuing power struggle between the conservatives and reformists. The reelection of Mohammad Khatami as president in May and his inauguration in August exacerbated this struggle. The country's poorly performing economy, which unlike Turkey's had already hit bottom, also preoccupied Tehran, as did its decade-long drought, the worst in decades. Even in March some rivers, such as the Zeyandeh, which flows under the beautiful bridges of Isfahan, was dry as a bone as early as February. In Turkey, newspapers exposed new corruption scandals nearly every day. In Iran, newspapers and magazines were closed down almost every day. Jailing of reformers, newspaper and magazine editors, and campaigns against moral depravity, improper attire, social decay and drugs preocuppied the government.

Iran was a frequent target of Turkish media outrage. There were many reports of the arrest of members of Hizballah (a pro-Islamist organization comprising mostly Kurds, initially supported by Turkish intelligence organizations to counter the PKK) and the discovery of caches of their weapons and bodies of people they had killed. Senior Turkish officials asserted, however, that Tehran had severed its relations with Hizballah as a result of Turkey's pressure on Tehran, while "all those [Iranian] groups providing them with training and weapons were clamped down on."6

Surprisingly, in interviews with Mehmet Ali Birand, a well-known journalist, high-ranking intelligence officials acknowledged that it was not Iran's support for the Hizballah that was the main cause of terrorism, but the "poverty of the people, largely Kurds of the southeast and east of Turkey. They [Hizballah] use the religious angle, but the key element is poverty," said one security official.

The reassurance from the intelligence authorities that poverty was the principal cause of terrorism diasppeared from the media as soon as it was announced in the press that Hizballah members had assassinated Gaffer Okkan, security director for the martial-law administration in the province of Diyarbakir. Okkan had been presented to the Turkish and Kurdish public by the media and government as instrumental in restoring cooperative relations between the security forces, police and the predominantly Kurdish population of the city and the region. The Turkish media lambasted Iran as the culprit behind the assassination. Such charges governed discourse in the media for the next several months until Okkan's killers were apprehended, tried and convicted.7


AZERBAIJAN AGAIN

Even as Turkey was occuppied with Okkan's murder, corruption, scandals and the imminent collapse of the ecnomy, the issue of Azerbaijan begin to creep higher on Turkey's political agenda. On February 6, Meral Aksener, interior minister during the Tansu filler-Mesut Yilmaz government (1994-96), and a strong Turkish nationalist, gave a long interview to various media in which she advocated the union of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Such a unification would be both "an alternative to the EU as well as a catalyst. If the EU is sincere about Turkey's entry into the EU, this unification would strenghten it. If the EU did not favor such a unification, it [the unification] could be used an an alternative for Turkey to EU membership." Aksener suggested that the peoples of Turkey and Azerbaijan should vote in a referendum on the unification proposal. A favorable vote would "put an end to the games that are being played against Turkey and Azerbaijan, strenghten the EU, if it accepted the new unified country as an EU member, and make our relations with the U.S. and Russia more healthy."8 Aksener did not elaborate on how such a unification would make the newly unified country's relations with Moscow and Washington healthier. No doubt Tehran concluded that such a statement by a former interior minister must have been made in consultation with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and National Intelligence Agency (MIT). Iran would have to brace itself for more firestorms in the Caspian region.

Though Aksener's proclamations would seem to have made for a cold welcome when Ismail Cem arrived in Tehran on February 12, the foreign minister was nevertheless received cordially. Talks focused on two issues: security and trade. Ankara was suspicious that Tehran was still supporting the PKK and, possibly, Hizballah and that the regime would allow the Majlis to pass a bill acknowledging that the Armenians were victims of genocide at the hands of the Turks in 1915-- 16. Cem was also irritated by Iran's support for Armenia and its occupation of 16 to 18 percent of Azerbaijan's territory and by Tehran's closer defense relations with Russia. All four concerns bore on Turkey's policy to strenghten relations with Baku in partnership with Israel and the United States. Cem hoped that he and Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi would be able to come to some understanding as to each country's interest in the new developments taking place between the KDP and PUK in northern Iraq.9 He told the Iranians that if and when the gas pipeline between the two countries was completed, Turkey's trade deficit with Iran would balloon from $400 million to $1,400 million. Given this figure, Iran would simply have to purchase more goods from Turkey.

Asgar Ferdi, an adviser to former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, stated that other issues were discussed. One was that in no way should the map of South Kurdistan [northern Iraq] be changed: "Because the U.S.'s closest base is in Incirlik, it wants to open a base in northern Iraq; Iran does not want this. But Iran is not opposed to an autonomous government there; it looks favorably upon it." Second, Iran stated its opposition to Turkey's alliance with Israel: "Tehran advised the Turks that its relationship with Israel was isolating Turkey within its own geography." Third, Ferdi was sure that Iran would reject Turkey's request that it be allowed to open a MIT office in Tehran because of the close relationship between MIT, the CIA and Mossad.10

By March it was clear that Azerbaijan and all of the problems associated with it were beginning to dominate the relationship. March 13-14, during a visit to Ankara, Azerbaijan President Haydar Aliyev, in an official state speech, eulogized Kemal Ataturk and stated to his Turkish audience, "We (Azeris) know the value and worth of the Turkish Republic better than you do." In another speech to Turkish parlimentarians, Aliyev told the MPs, "Here [in the Turkish parliament] I feel like I am in my own country among my brothers. "11 Aliyev's speeches must have brought tears of joy to Meral Aksener's eyes. While in Ankara, the Azerbaijan president called for a "strategic partnership" with Turkey. After leaving Turkey, Aliyev spent the next several months trying to negotiate some kind of settlement with Armenian President Robert Kocharian during several meetings in Europe. In April, both Aliyev and Kocharian journeyed to Key West, Florida, for more negotiations. It was clear that the strategic partnership between Ankara and Baku would have to await resolution of the Nargorno-Karabakh dispute.

As Ismail Cem had agreed in February, Turkish Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan, accompanied by General Ali Aksiz, head of the intelligence department of the Gendarmeri, and Muzeffer Erkan, head of the intelligence department of Turkey's Security Directorate, visited Tehran and Tabriz in early May. Security issues were the order of the day: northern Iraq and Hizballah and like organizations were at the top of the agenda. The Turkish press reported that Tantan presented Iranian Interior Minister Abdol Vahid Mussavi Lari with a 163-page file on the activites of the PKK and other "extremist Islamic groups, including the Hizballah in Iran."12

Tensions between the two capitals eased somewhat after Cem's February visit. On June 22, Turkey's Constitutional Court banned the Islamist Virtue (Fazilet) party. This passed largely without comment from the Iranian government and media. This relative silence regarding the banning of the largest Islamist political party in Turkey and the third-largest political party in the country was greater than what followed the banning of the Welfare (Refah) party some 17 months earlier.13 By June 2001, it was clear that Iran had made a strategic decision not to interfere, even via its media, in the internal struggles of Turkey's political parties. The days of Sincan seemed a matter of the past. This improved atmosphere was evident when Faruk Logoglu, Turkish Foreign Ministry undersecretary (soon to be appointed ambassador to Washington) visited Iran on June 26-27 and proclaimed his satisfaction with the two states' relations, as did Muhsin Aminzade, Iran's deputy foreign minister. The serenity of Logoglu and Aminzade's talks belied the problems concerning the completion of the gas pipeline. Throughout the summer of 2001, each capital blamed the other for the lack of progress on the pipeline. By July, it seemed that U.S. pressure on Turkey was delaying the final completion.


TURKEY-ISRAEL ALLIANCE: TARGET IRAN NOW?

Developments in June disproved further those analysts who thought the Turkey-Israel alliance would be confined primarily to the two countries' relations with the Arab countries. The expansion of Israel's military might and intelligence capabilities in Turkey, and Israeli intelligence presence in Azerbaijan, made it clear that Iran was increasingly becoming a target of the Jerusalem-Ankara axis.14 Israeli analysts themselves acknowledged that the joint Turkey-Israel-U.S. "Anatolian Eagle" air exercises held in June near the city of Konya had Iran very much in focus. Analysts had remarked previously that one of the consesequences of the alliance was that it allowed Turkey and its Israeli ally to become major players in the security of the Gulf. This had been accomplished by Turkey's relations with the Kurdish Regional Governnment (KRG) in northern Iraq, which, as discussed above, brought Turkey's geopolitical security perimeter some 200-250 km southward, where the Iraq-Iran border abuts the territory of Iranian Azerbaijan. It is possible that Turkey would deploy anti-ballistic missiles, eventually including the Arrow to be obtained from Israel, on bases in Turkey and possibly in northern Iraq, with the needed Israeli personnel to operate them. The Arrow missile was used during the Anatolian Eagle exercises.

During his visit to Ankara on July 9, Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-- Eliezer, charged that "Iran's missile development plans have begun to threaten not only Israel, but also Turkey. As far as we [Israel] know, by the year 2005 they will be ready." He stressed the increasing threat from Iran and Turkey's need for a missile shield: "Just imagine," exclaimed Ben-- Eliezer, "a nuclear weapon in the hands of fundamentalists."15 Upon returning to Israel from Turkey, Ben-Eliezer claimed that "Hizballah [Lebanon] had received 8,000 Katyusha rockets from Tehran" and described Tehran as "the mother of international terrorism."16 On the same day the Israeli daily Haaretz reported that Hizballah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) facilities were being replenished by Iran.17

In the wake of Ben-Eliezer's visit, it was announced that 12 percent of Israel's air bombers and fighting aircraft were to be permanently stationed in Turkey. Israel already based 12 percent of its naval and submarine forces on Turkish bases. The two countries also agreed that a portion of Israel's armored forces would be based in Turkey and some of Israel's Chariot-3 tanks would be sent to southeast Turkey. This meant that if the Kurds decided to engage again in major combat against the Turkish government, they would be confronted with Israeli as well as Turkish tanks. Needless to say, the deployment of Israeli tanks in southeast and possibly eastern Turkey placed this armored force close to Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan.18

Azerbaijani Parliamentary Speaker Murtuz Aleskerev, who was in Ankara during Ben-Eliezer's visit, stated that Baku would welcome Israel's presence and weapons in Azerbaijan. He added that Baku was very unhappy with the strengthening relations among Iran, Russia and Armenia and that a Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia-- Israel alliance was needed to counter it. Ariel Sharon, prior to his August 8 visit to Turkey, in an interview with CNN-Turkey and the Turkish Daily News, affirmed that he would be interested in a "partnership" among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia: "I will say in Ankara that we are willing to enhance the relationship with Azerbaijan against Iran, Russia and Armenia."19 Iran's position concerning Turkey's and Israel's heightened interest in Azerbaijan became clearer after July 23, when its warships and aircraft forced a BP/Amoco oil exploration ship to leave Caspian Sea waters that it claimed as its own. A series of incidents continued between Azerbaijan and Iran throughout the remainder of July and the first part of August. When Baku announced that Turkish jet fighters would conduct air exercises in the skies over Baku during Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu's visit on August 25, the Iranians exploded: "Turkey's actions are aimed at fulfilling and satisfying the interests and policies of its friends and allies like the U.S. and the Zionist entity." The Iran Times stated bluntly that Turkey was trying to increase tensions in the area to aid its U.S. and Israel allies, making Israel one of the main beneficiaries of the Baku-Tiblisi—Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. It became clear that Tehran's strong stance in the Caspian Sea standoff against Azerbaijan originated, in part, to prevent the completion of the pipeline. Turkey, deeply indebted to the United States and Israel for their support of the $16.1 billion promised to Turkey by the IMF and World Bank, was hardly in a position to resist Washington's and Jerusalem's escalation of tension with Iran.

During Ariel Sharon's August 8 visit to Ankara, in spite of a tight schedule (the Turkish press was full of questions regarding Israel's attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza), Sharon made it a priority to meet with Kemal Dervis, a former World Bank vice-president who had been brought (or sent) to manage the financial crisis that Turkey fell into after February. Sharon assured Dervis that Israel "would do all that it could to help Turkey obtain the funds it needed to solve the crisis."20 Sharon was apparently alluding to the influence that it held with the IMF and World Bank officials, the American Jewish community and the pro-Israel forces in the U.S. government, almost all of whom supported anti-Iran polices and stonger ties among Ankara, Jerusalem and Azerbaijan.21

On August 11, Dervis again turned to Israel for advice and support. He invited Israeli professor Nissan Liviatan, along with Daniel Luis Gleizer, assistant head of Brazil's Central Bank, and Alijandro M. Werner, general research director of Mexico's Central Bank, to discuss Turkey's hyperinflation and high interest rates. Thus, when Sharon promised that "he would do all that he could" to help Turkey, the chances were quite good that he would do so. One of the costs of this help would be a more belligerent attitude on the part of Ankara toward Tehran.

The frustration and apprehension in Iran was made clear in a Tehran Times report on July 16 claiming that one of Israel's objectives was to purchase land in Turkey and that it had already done so in Azerbaijan, with the obvious intent to establish military and/or intelligence bases there in league with its Turkish ally.22 As mentioned above, Tehran already feared that Turkey would allow Israel to build or use its bases in northern Iraq. By mid-- summer 2001, Tehran obviously thought that the Turkey-Israel-U.S. pincer was drawing tighter.


THE CASPIAN SEA INCIDENT

The slow improvement of relations ended abruptly on July 23, when the aforementioned two Iranian Air Force (IAF) planes overflew a BP/Amoco oil-- exploration ship in the Caspian Sea. Later that same evening an Iranian warship entered Azerbaijan's territorial waters and threatened to fire on the research ship, Geophysics-3, unless it left the area. Iran claimed the area and had given the oil field located in the contested waters the name of Alborz, the same field Azerbaijan referred to as the Araz-Alov-Shargh field. Akad Gazi, Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, claimed the agreements signed between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1920, 1921and 1940 dealt only with both states' shipping rights in the Caspian Sea and not with a sectoral division of the sea or the seabed. He also asserted that the Astara-- Hassan Guli line did not demarcate the border between Iran and the Soviet Union, but that it simply had been accepted as the recognized border
because the Soviet Union as the stronger country would not let Iran cross the line.23

Moscow also had repudiated the Soviet-era treaties, but it had agreed with the other riparian states that the demarcation of the seabed should be aligned with each country's border projected into the Caspian. Such a demarcation would have left Iran with approximately 13 percent of the seabed, while it was claiming around 20 percent. Were Iran granted the 20 percent it claimed, it would mean that the Astara (Azerbaijan) to Hassan Guli (Turkmenistan) line, which had generally been treated since 1991 as the Azerbaijan-IranTurkmenistan border, was not accepted by Iran. The Araz-Alov-Shargh/Alborz oil field is considerably north of the Astara-- Hassan Guli line.

Turkmenistan quickly supported Iran's actions and claims. On July 27, in what seemed like coordinated actions with Tehran, Ashgabad sent a diplomatic note to Baku claiming that the fields it referred to as Osman, Khazar and Atyn-Asyr (and that Azerbaijan called the Shargh, Guneshly and Azeri fields) belonged to Turkmenistan. Tehran and Ashgabad were fully lined up against Baku. Russia and Kazakhstan used the occasion to plead for negotiations to reach a binding legal settlement for the division of the Caspian.

From the July 23 incident throughout the remainder of August, there were constant complaints by Azerbaijan that Iran was violating its air space. Ankara quickly placed itself on the side of Baku. On August 13, an official of Azerbaijan's embassy in Ankara declared, "There was nothing more natural than for our friend and brother Turkey to take a strong stance against Iran's aggressive position because of cooperation on the BTC pipeline and our strategic cooperation on a number of issues."24 The Turks obviously had the BTC pipeline on their minds, as some of the oil to feed the pipeline was to come from the Azerbaijan-claimed Araz-Alov-- Shargh oil field that Azerbaijan and a consortium of international oil companies (SOLAR) expected to exploit.

The Turkish media were also quick to point out that Israel and the United States were closely tracking developments in the Caspian. This was emphasized when Ariel Sharon, during his August 8 visit to Ankara, stated that Israel was interested in even closer relations with Azerbaijan and in a Turkey-Israel-Georgia-Azerbaijan alliance to counter an Iran-Russia-Armenia alliance. Turkey also maintained that Iran's Shahab-3
missiles were operational and that, as Israel's defense minister had stated during his visit to Turkey, Iran would be a nuclear power by 2005. Furthermore, if Iran attacked Azerbaijan, Israel, in cooperation with
Turkey, would come to the aid of Baku. Ankara seemed confident that if Iran's threatening actions increased, the United States could be compelled to intervene. The media stressed that Ankara, Washingon and Jerusalem were in constant contact regarding the current crisis.25 Neither did Ankara wait long to pull the PKK card out of the deck and charge that Iran was "looking after the PKK better in order to keep the terrorist
card in its control."26 For its part, Tehran was also eager to keep Kurdish nationalists under control. On August 16, Iran's Basji's forces staged war games in Qorveh, a city in the west of Koordestan province. Allahnour Nourallah, the commander of the Basji, said his forces were ready to fight against "any plots hatched by the U.S. and the Zionists."27 On August 14, a Tehran criminal court also tried a dissident Kurdish leader accused of masterminmding the massacre of 43 Iranian military officers in Koordestan province in the early 1980s.28

THE AZERI QUESTION

It was not just the Caspian Sea crisis that preoccupied Tehran. On August 22, in the midst of concerns with the Kurds, Turks, Israelis and Americans, the Azeri question again came to the fore. On that day there was a failed assassination attempt on Piruz Dilanci, leader of the National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan (NLMSA), at his home in Baku. Dilanci did not rule out that the assassination attempt might have been organized by Tehran's agents.29 The NLMSA was organized in the early 1990s by a group of political emigres from Iran of Azeri origin. The NLMSA declared its principal goal was the independence of Southern Azerbaijan, i.e., Iran-Azerbaijan.

Tehran could not, however, dawdle over the actions of the NLMSA. Ankara announced that Chief of the Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu was to visit Baku on August 25, accompanied by 10 F-16 fighter aircraft and a Turkish Air Force aerobatic team dubbed "the Stars." Indeed, the Stars performed a 22-minute air show in the skies over Baku and the Caspian. Ankara's message to Tehran seemed clear and somewhat provocative.

Kivrikoglu's agenda in Baku reportedly entailed more military aid, greater support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and promises that what the Turks could not fulfill would be delivered by Israel and/or the United States. Given Baku's inability to counter Iran, Azerbaijan President Aliyev would have to be doubly sure of support from the latter two countries or maybe Russia if he decided to raise the ante against Tehran. Aliyev's announcement that he would go to Tehran in September seemed to suggest that he did not want relations with Tehran to worsen.

By the end of August, it was unclear how the Caspian crisis of July-August would end. But Iran's actions against the BP/Amoco oil-exploration ship seems to have been caused by several factors: (1) Tehran was obviously concerned about falling short of controlling 20 percent of the Caspian seabed, which would allow it to claim and exploit the Araz-Alov-Shargh/ Alborz oil field. This is not because of an oil shortage in Iran, but rather to prevent the projected BTC oil pipeline from going forward. The completion of the BTC would mean that, once again, Iran would be bypassed for oil and gas pipelines. Iran's increasingly recalcitrant neighbor, Turkey, and its ally, Israel, would be the beneficaries of the BTC, which irked the Iranians. (2) Increasing Azerbaijan, Turkish, Israeli and U.S. cooperation threatened Iran's vital national interests in regard to the exploitation, export and carrying of oil. (3) The specter of increased Azerbaijan support for the national independence of southern Azerbaijan, i.e., much of northern Iran, was even more of a threat than the fear of a diminished position in the Caspian basin.

In September the Azeri question reared up again. On September 10, Professor Mahmud Ali Johragani, head of NLMSA, was summoned to Iran's revolutionary court for questioning. When subsequently queried as to the reasons for the questioning, Johragani responded that he believed it was because of Tehran's unhappiness with interviews he had given to an Azeri TV station and to "foreign agencies." "A strong national revival movement is underway here [Iran-- Azerbaijan]," said the NLMSA leader.30 The next day Tehran had more to worry about. On September 11, when terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center's twin towers in New York, Cahandar Bayoglu, the head of the press service of the United Azerbaijan Movement (UAA, headquarted in Baku), said that he had "no doubt that one of the pilots of the Iranian aircraft which had recently made incursions into Azerbaijan air space had taken part in the terror attacks in the USA." He added, "Undemocratic Iran had always supported terrorism." Bayoglu called on the world to topple the Tehran regime in order to free itself of international terrorism. He stated that Azerbaijan had to take on Armenia and "Persian" terrorism in its struggle for national independence: "Millions of Azeris were displaced as a result of Armenian terrorism, and 30 million Azeris are still living under Persian terrorism."31

By autumn 2001, there was no doubt that a "revived" Azeri question was beginning to occupy Tehran's time. Azeri nationalism coupled with Kurdish nationalism, either or both supported by Turkey, Israel and/or the United States, would potentially spell the end of the Islamic regime and of the state of Iran. Loss of a strong geopolitical posture in the Caspian basin or Azerbaijan itself would make Iran an anemic geopolitical entity. Worse, armed conflict or a strong nationalist movement in Azerbaijan-Iran would threaten the existence of the state.


AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

Just prior to September 11, President Khatami received Azerbaijan's national security minister, Namiq Abbasov, and stressed the "special significance" of Tehran's relations with Baku. He expressed satisfaction that President Aliyev would be visiting Iran the next week. The trip, however, had not taken place by the end of the year for various reasons. One was Aliyev's unhappiness with foot dragging in Tehran regarding the extradition of Mahir Cavodov, who had sought refuge in Iran after, purportedly, planning a coup to topple Aliyev, with the implication that Cavodov's plans had Tehran's blessing.32 Aliyev also wanted to encourage Iran to settle the delimitation issue on a bilateral baisis, a hope that also had not been realized by the end of the year. Iran's relations with Azerbaijan were complicated further after September 11. It was already clear that Russian relations with Iran were built largely on weapons procurement and cooperation in the nuclear field as well as on some shared policies in Central Asia and Afghanistan: both countries were eager to get rid of the Taliban. But Iran did not like Russia's invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to visit Moscow September 5-6, while the intifada was raging in the West Bank and Gaza. It also felt slighted that Moscow's relations with Israel, Turkey, the EU and the United States were more important than the national security needs of Iran. Tehran was particularly put off that the trip to Moscow of Defense Minister Ali Shamkani, scheduled for the same time as Sharon's, had to be postponed until early October, during which time Shamkani did sign a muliti-- million-dollar arms agreement.33

The events of September 11 dominated news in the Middle East throughout the rest of the year, but developments of the three issues being discussed here continued unabated, albeit with a lower profile in the media. It must have given Iran pause when Azerbaijan's defense minister flew to Moscow reportedly to grant Russia long-- term rental concessions for a radar base in Azerbaijan.34 This was in addition to an earlier agreement between the two countries to expand military-technical cooperation with respect to air defenses.35


RESIGNATION OF KURDISH MPS

Even as it had to deal with Moscow-- Baku relations, Tehran was confronted once again with Kurdish unrest. On September 30, six Kurdish MPs resigned from the Majlis, complaining that Kurds were treated as second-class citizens. The ostensible cause of the resignations was the appointment by the Interior Ministry of a new provincial governor-general to Koordistan province. The new appointee was neither Kurdish nor Sunni. The former governor, Abdullah Ramazanzadeh, is both, as are the majority of Kurds in Koordistan province and, with the exception of Kermanshah province, in the Kurdish regions of northwest Iran. The resignations highlighted once again the unhappiness of Kurds with the lack of economic development and the paucity of Kurds at the top levels of administration in the Kurdish regions and the perceived discrimination against Sunnis throughout the country. The sensitivity of the resignations was made clear when Mohammad Reza Khatami, the first deputy speaker of the Majlis and brother of the president, refused to accept them.36 The Iran News said the resignations were "ill timed" and warned that in light of the regional crisis caused by September 11, "the ethnic issue of the Kurds is a volatile topic for the international media." The resignation of the MPs created conditions "favorable to the emergence of tribal and linguistic coalitions in the Majlis."37 The last thing Tehran wanted was more ethnic strife when throughout October it was enmeshed in negotiations with Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, the EU and, above all, the United States as it prosecuted its war in Afghanistan.

Turkey and Iran found it necessary, given the war in Afghanistan, to assure that no major incidents involving the PKK or the Mojahedin-e halq occurred along their borders. The now familiar Iranian Deputy Interior Mininister Gholam-Hossein Bolanian arrived in Ankara on October22 to attend the eighth joint meeting of the Turkey-Iran Commission on Security Cooperation, where he was met by Turkish Deputy Interior Minister Muzeffer Ecemis. Both ministers promised to fight "terrorism" by all conceivable means. Tehran, it seems, was also concerned enough to persuade Baku not to allow Mojahedin-e halq members to operate in Azerbaijan or to make common cause with the United Azerbaijan Movement (UAA) in Baku. It was apparently at this October meeting between Bolandian and Ecemis that Iran promised, rather categorically, that it would no longer provide support to the PKK, at least in launching attacks against Turkey from Iran's territory.

Turkey, for its part, promised to cease all political and moral assistance to the NLMSA and its honorary chairman, Mahmud Ali Johragani. At the end of December, Dr. Johragani was dismissed from his position purportedly because of his "collaboration" with the Iranian Security Ministry (Ettelaat). Johragani's oppontents in the NLMSA alleged that he had come to an agreement with the Iranian authorities not to engage in activities contrary to Iran's constitution. The honorary chairman responded that he was compelled to do so because of heightened cooperation between Turkish and Iranian security forces. Johragani's NLMSA opponents claimed that he cooperated with Ettelaat in order to get a passport to seek medical attention in Sweden. The parliamentary council of the NLMSA in turn accused Dr. Johragani of actions "running counter to the sacred idea of the UAA's and NLMSA's parliamentary platform," and, hence, it had no choice but to dismiss him from a leadership position. Partisans of Johragani in NLMSA's political council denied that Johragani had been dismissed.38 By the end of the year, Iranian authorities had still not granted Johragani his passport. Whatever the internal politics of the NLMSA, it is clear that Tehran was eager to cooperate with Turkey to crush its nationalist activities. A mushrooming "Azerbaijan question" in addition to the growing Kurdish question within Iran was more than it wanted, as it fought to maintain its geopolitical space in the Caspian region, Central Asia and Afghanistan.


BACK TO THE CASPIAN

On November 1, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed that Caspian Sea resources should be divided "along lines acceptable to bordering and opposite countries, i.e., in a bilateral format."39 This placed these countries at odds with Iran's desire for a consensual agreement among all five states. The agreement was signed in Moscow and announced by Viktor Kalyuzhny, Russian deputy foreign minister and Moscow's special envoy on the status of the Caspian Sea Kalyuzhny stated that the agreement envisaged an absence of maritime borders, i.e., keeping the sea surface as an area of common usage. The delimitation into national sectors would apply only to the seabed. As for the method of demarcation, Kalyuzhny stated that three of the countries agreed to a modified line of the median projected from the national borders; Turkmenistan, however, favored a method of latitudinal division.40.

During the next two months, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed bilateral agreements with one another. Turkmenistan, still in dispute with Azerbaijan over the Araz-Alov-Shargh/Alborz fields, did not. Iran still clung to its position of July 23, increasingly becoming the odd man out.41

Throughout November and December, Viktor Kalyuzhny continued to press his case with Iran. On November 26 he met with Iran's special envoy on the status of the Caspian Sea, Mehi Sarfi, pleading with him to abandon his position. Kalyuzhny added for emphasis, "America perceives the Caspian as a`second Persian Gulf' and, given this, it is absolutely necessary for the riparian states to arrive at `basic agreements' on the Caspian."42

Meanwhile, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to divide the Caspian seabed into national sectors and agreed upon a median line. On November 29, during a CIS meeting in Moscow, Kazakh-stan and Azerbaijan signed a similar agreement, while Russia and Kazakhstan also agreed to the status of the Kurmangazy oil field that straddles their agreed-upon median line. The field was to be under Russian jurisdiction, but Kazakhstan would be involved in its development. The field's oil was to be pumped through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline.

The Caspian Sea did not occupy much of the agenda during Kemal Kharrazi's visit with Ismail Cem in Turkey on November 5. The two foreign ministers seemed preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan. Here, too, Ankara seemed to be in the catbird seat. Influenced by Turkey's enthusiastic support of the U.S. war on terrorism, the IMF had just granted Turkey an additional $10-billion loan and a $3-billion supplementary loan, bringing the total IMF and World Bank loans delivered and promised to Turkey in 2001-02 to a total of some $29 billion, almost one-third of Iran's GDP! When Argentina's economy went into freefall in late December and early January 2002 and the peso was devalued by 40 percent, it caused wags in Turkey to say, "Poor Argentina, so far from Afghanistan!" 43

Furthermore, it was made clear that Turkey would be a strong supporter of the United States if it decided to attack Iraq, the consequence of which would complicate and weaken Iran's overall geopolitical position in the region. Iran could take no solace in the fact that the pro-Israel and Jewish lobbies and the supporters of the Turkey-Israel alliance would moderate demands that the United States attack both Iraq and Iran (these groups and individuals were calling for an attack on Iran because of the latter's support of Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza and opposition to U.S. policies in Afghanistan). Most of the anti-Iran crowd were strongly pro-Turkey, among the most important of whom were Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense; Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board; Elliot Abrams, President Bush's top aide for global issues; Douglas Feith, under-secretary for defense policy; and, among journalists, William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, a strongly pro-Israel and pro-Turkey periodical which, because of its strong stance for agressive U.S. foreign policies, has shot into prominence during the last two years;44 and William Safire, columnist for The New York Times.

On the same day that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on delimiting what is to become their portions of the Caspian Sea, President Bush in a special White House communique congratulated Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman as well as the American oil companies Texaco and ExxonMobil, on the inauguration of the CPC to carry oil from the Kazakhstan and Caspian oil fields via pipelines to various locations in Russia including ports on the Black Sea. Bush stressed that the prospect of the consortium promotes the realization of a new national energy strategy elaborated by this administration, which stipulated the diversification of oil deliveries to the USA and the construction of a network of Caspian oil pipelines along the routes as Baku-Tbilisi—Ceyhan [BTC], a Turkish port on the coast of the Iskenderun Strait of the Mediterranean, Baku-Georgia, Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea, Baku-Novorossiysk, as well as a gas pipeline, Baku-Tibilsi-Erzurum in eastern Turkey.45

The White House communique did not mention that an oil pipeline already exists from Baku to Supsa and from Baku to Novorossiysk. A Baku-Tbilisi gas pipeline simply needs a section built from Tbilisi to the Turkish border and from Erzerum to the Georgian border. The gas pipeline would also provide Turkey with another gas pipeline in addition to the one opened from Iran in December 2001.

An agreement signed at the CIS meeting in Moscow on November 29, 2001, seems to have encouraged the BP-- AIOC consortium to again undertake seismographic and perhaps test drilling in the Araz-Alov-Saragh/Alborz fields. The announcement seemed to suggest that this time around, Azerbaijan might even be backed militarily by Russia if Iran again sent gunboats into the disputed area. The BP-AIOC announcement placed Iran in a difficult position: either it would have to retreat from its bellicose stand of July 23 or acquiesce to negotiations that clearly would not accommodate its demands. The bilateral agreements among four of the riparian states since the July 23 incident preempted such a result.

Secondly, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Kalyuzhuny had already informed Iran that "the U.S. perceived the Caspian Sea as a `second Perisian Gulf.'"46 As the United States at first seemed to have the support of nearly every country in the region, including Iran, in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan, it seemed doubtful that Iran would revert to its bellicose position of July. By the end of December 2001, it had not. However, neither had Iran or Turkmenistan signed bilateral delimiting agreements with their neighbors. Iran did receive support from President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who, in December, urged Washington to consider the strategic role of Iran as a transport route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas. Nazarbaev also hoped to soften Tehran's position on the delimiting of the Caspian Sea. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell quickly threw cold water on Nazarbaev's recommendation, stating emphatically, "I see nothing in the post-September 11 environment that leads me to think we should change the U.S. policy in routing pipelines from Central Asia."47 Iran was able, however, to draw some solace from the fact that a large number of international oil and gas companies also favored Iranian routes. There was also more good news for Iran in early December, when Ankara at last agreed to open the spigot on the gas pipeline from Iran, apparently due to U.S. satisfaction with Iran's initial cooperation in its war against terrorism.

In mid-December the "Azeri" question again became an issue. Tehran closed the Shams Tabriz newspaper, and its chief editor, Ali Hamidian, was arrested by the Tabriz Press Court on December 11. The editorial office of the Navide Azerbaijan newspaper in Urmiya, a town on the western shore of Lake Urmiya, was also closed. The UAA immediately condemned the actions as "Persian chauvinism" and violations of the rights of south Azerbaijan. The UAA also condemed Baku authorities for busting up a journalists' picket line in Baku several days earlier.48 Both the UAA and its sister organization, NLMSA, obviously thought that Baku and Tehran were each bent on crushing their organizations.

At the end of 2001, another issue that affected Turkey-Russian relations was whether in the near future an oil and an accompaning gas pipeline would be built from Baku via Tbilisi to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This project (BTC) has been talked about since the early 1990s, the heyday of the U.S. and EU plans to create an east-west pipeline corridor from Central Asia to Europe, thereby diminishing Russia's and Iran's role in the distribution of these resources. Despite setbacks and Russia's rebirth as a major player in the distribution game, the possibility of such pipelines would further diminish Iran's geopolitical role as compared to that of Turkey, although the opening of the longdelayed gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey might go some way in alleviating Tehran's fears that it would be bypassed.49

Until the opening of the Iran gas pipeline in December, Turkey had become dependent on Russia for around 80 percent of its gas. The completion of a gas pipeline, the Blue Stream across the Black Sea sometime in late 2002, assures that Turkey will remain very dependent on Russian sources for some time. The existence of a "Russian party" composed of oil and gas executives, construction comglomerates and tradesmen, purported to include highranking politicians like Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the Motherland party and a coalition partner in the Ecevit government, also seems to insure that dependence on Russia will continue.50

The influence of the "Russian" lobby resulted in a huge energy scandal, called "White Energy," that ended in 2001 with the resignation of Cumhur Ersumer, the minister of energy, a member of the Motherland party and close confidant of Yilmaz. Indeed, in June Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan was dismissed from his post because of his ministry's investigation into energy scandals regarding the contracts and tenders for the Blue Stream and Western pipelines running from Ukraine via the Balkans to Turkey. The Western gas pipeline runs across Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria and had a carrying capacity of 6 bcm/y in 2000. A deal was concluded in April 1997 to enable Turkey to receive 14 bcm/y by 2002. The current pipeline is also in the process of being expanded to 9.9 bcm/y, and a parallel line is to be laid to transport the remaining gas.51 It also must be noted that Turkey and Russia hope to increase their trade in the next few years to the near $10 billion it had reached prior to the Russian economic crisis of 1998. While the completion of the Blue Stream Project will favor Russia, Turkish business people see Russia as a large and potentially lucrative market. The announcement in mid-January that the United States supported a reported $12-- billion investment in Russia's Sakhalin Islands' oil and gas fields also could encourage Russia to be more amenable to the building of the BTC pipelines and the contribution that it will make to an east-- west energy corridor across Turkey.52

Russia also realizes that stronger relations with Turkey enhance its burgeoning trade and economic cooperation with Israel, especially Moscow-Jerusalem cooperation in aircraft (helicopters), missiles and avionics. The strong alliance between Turkey and Israel has the blessing of the United States. In addition, Russia still has a million Jews. During his visit to Moscow in early September, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow more Jews to emigrate to Israel. One day before his departure for Moscow, Sharon had a telephone converstation with New York Times columnist William Safire, who wrote: Looking beyond the Middle Eastern war of attrition, Sharon is thinking of strategies about the strengthening of Israel's population. Sharon believes "Putin has energized Jewish communal life here, with Hebrew schools in 400 communities. It's like a golden age with freedom of worship. Matter of fact, it worries me [Sharon] because we want a million more Jews. So I tell them [the Jews], don't get used to it, move to Israel."53

Needless to say, Iran can do little to counter the interfacing needs and policies of Turkey, Israel, Russia, the U.S. government and the American Jewish community.54

It therefore came as no surprise when, in late December, Moscow announced that its largest oil company, LUKoil, would like to participate in the construction of the BTC pipeline project. This affirmed to some that Russia's changed position would increase the likelihood that the pipeline would be built, in spite of the doubts of some oil consortia that the resources of the Caspian would justify the estimated $3- to $4-billion project. Vagit Alekperev, the president of LUKoil, stated that his company would like a 7.5-percent stake in the BTC consortium that was to construct the line. Some analysts suggested that Russia had relented because Alekperev is an ethnic Azerbaijani and a strong candidate to succeed the aging Haydar Aliyev as the next president of Azerbaijan. Russia would undoubtedly be delighted to have one of its most well-- known and respected businessmen as the next president of Azerbaijan. There are also those analysts who suggest that by joining the consortium Russia and LUKoil would be in a favorable position to sabotage the completion of the BTC.55

A better explanation seems to be that Moscow perceived American's war on terrorism as an opportune time to be more cooperative on the construction of the BTC and, hence, on a variety of policies that the pipeline affects with regard to Russia-- Israel, Russia-Turkey, Turkey-Israel and Turkey's relations with the American Jewish community. In the wake of September 11, if the United States and the West choose to lessen their dependency on the oil resources of Saudi Arabia and increase supplies from the Caspian basin and from a Saddam-less Iraq, this will strengthen U.S. relations with Turkey and Israel and impel Russia to be more cooperative. Moscow's participation in the construction of the BTC will be an indication of its cooperation and its understanding of potential strategic shifts in the wake of September 11. Iran has no such levergage.

In late January 2002, Tehran had more to worry about. On January 31, an Azerbaijan news agency carried a story entitled, "Fate of our compariots in Iran discussed at U.S. State Department." The report alleged that a U.S. State Department representative met with a group calling itself the Congress of Azerbaijanis of the World, headed by Ahmad Obali. The delegation reportedly discussed the "flagrant violations of the rights of
over 30 million Azeris by the Iranian regime." The State Department representative was told that the Iranian regime had banned the Azeri language, purposely destroyed Azeri historical monuments, translated Azeri geographical names into Farsi, banned political and public organizations set up to defend the rights of Azeris, and allowed no freedom of the press. It also charged that Azeris "were suffering from tortures, and they were being murdered in prisons." The State Department official was reported as saying she "had always been interested in the problems of Azerbaijan," adding, "Closer relations would be established between the Congress of Azerbaijanis of the World in the future in connection with the aforementioned issues."56 These developments seemed to indicate that in the future, if Iran persisted in not cooperating with the war against terrorism, that the "Azeri question" could become internationalized much as the "Kurdish question" was after the 1991 Gulf War.

None of the above developments would be welcomed in Iran. The adoption of the bilateral negotiating method by four of the Caspian Sea riparian states would reduce Iran's exploitation of the seabed to 13 percent; the completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline, the building of the TCP gas pipeline, and the constructon of the BTC oil and gas pipeline would diminish further Iran's hopes of being a route for energy pipelines. An Afghanistan with its oil, gas and minerals, especially uranium, under U.S. control, with American-and European-dominated oil, gas and mineral consortia managing the exploitation of Afghani resources, also increases the likelihood that Iran will be excluded from participation, lessening its interest in being cooperative in the war against terrorism. Increased focus by the United States, Europe and Turkish, Israeli and pro-Israeli and Jewish lobbies on the "Azeri question" exacerbates the mounting national security, geopolitical and geostrategic challenges that Tehran must deal with in regard to the issues discussed.

At the end of 2001, Iran appeared to have lost geopolitical "space" to Turkey on the crucial issues of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and the Kurds. A weakening Iranian economy, continued stalemate between the conservatives and the reformists, the activities of the UAA and NLMSA and the rise of Kurdish nationalism - all lessened Iran's ability to counteract the strengthening position of Turkey. Tehran's non-cooperative stance on "America's war againt terrorism" will not help matters.

Robert Olson

Dr. Olson is professor of history at the University of Kentucky.

---

The deployment of Israeli tanks in southeast and possibly eastern Turkey placed this armored force close to Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan.

Turkey would be a strong supporter of the United States if it decided to attack Iraq, the consequence of which would complicate and weaken Iran's overall geopolitical position in the region.

Footnotes:

1 The potential problems created by such a projection of power on the part of Turkey are discussed in Robert Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 1998), pp. 77-87.

2 For relations between the two countries from the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in August 1997 to end of 2000, see Robert Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991-2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 2001), pp. 11-104.

3 UPI, January 18, 2001.

4 Iraq Report, Vol. 4, No. 3, January 19, 2001.

5 The New York Times, January 21, 2001.

6 TDN, January 27, 2001.

7 Hurriyet, January 27 and onward, 2001.

8 Ibid., February 6, 2001.

9 TDN, February 12-13, 2001; Kurdish Observer, February 14, 2001.

10 Kurdish Observer, February 17, 2001.

11 Hurriyet, March 14, 2001.

12 TDN, May 9, 2001.

13 Ankara was overjoyed when the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated on July 31 that it agreed with Turkey's Constitutional Court's banning of the Welfare party. Germany seemed particularly pleased with the ECHR's statement.

14 For more on the Turkey-Israel alliance, see Turkey's Relations . . , pp. 125-6; and Efraim Inbar, The Israeli-- Turkish Entente (London: Kings's College London Mediterranean Studies, 2001).

15 TDN, July 27, 2001. 11 Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2001. 11 Haaretz, July 17, 2001.

18 wki@jurd.org: This is the e-mail address of the Washington Kurdish Institute quoting DEKA-net-weekly, July 13, 2001.

19 TDN, August 6, 2001.

20 Ibid., August 9, 2001.

21 For more on these relationships, see Turkey's Relations, pp. 125-165.

22 Tehran TImes, July 16, 2001.

23 The Russian Journal, Vol. 4, No. 32 (125), August 17-23, 2001.

24 Hurriyet, August 13, 2001.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., August 14, 2001.

27 Ibid., August 16, 2001.

28 Ibid.

29 Iranian News, August 23, 2001.
30 BBC Monitoring Service, September 11, 2001. This interview was taken from Azerbaijan ANS TV station on September 10, 2001,

31 Iranian News reported by BBC Monitoring Service, September 13, 2001.

32 BBC Monitoring Service, October 29, 2001.

33 Ettelaat, October 8, 2001.

34 Iran News, September 14, 2001.

35 BBC Monitoring Service, November 12, 2001.

36 Iran Times, October 5, 2001.

37 RFE/RI Report, Vol. 4, No. 39, October 15, 2001.

38 BBC Monitoring Service, January 2, 2001.

39 Ibid., November 1, 2001.

40 The agreement stated "The median line interpreted as being every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the beselines from which the breadths of the territorial seas of each of the states to be measured."

41 BBC Monitoring Service, November 1, 2001.

42 Ibid.

41 Hurriyet, December 27, 2001.

44 A sign of the influence of the Weekly Standard is that its editors and journalists are frequently on major news programs and talk shows. Indeed, one of them has become a permanent member of the respected Jim Lehrer news hour on PBS.

45 centralasianews@ yahoogroups.com. 16 Ibid.

47 centralasianews@yahoogroups.com, December 11, 2001. a$ BBC Monitoring Service, December 15, 2001.

49 There is such a vast literature on this topic that here I will just mention a few important works. Laurent Ruseckas, "Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby," Journal of International Affairs (Columbia), Vol. 54, No.1, Fall, 2001, pp. 215-36; Nancy Lubin, "Pipedreams: Potential Impact of Energy Exploitation," Harvard International Review, Vol. 22, Issue 1, Winter/Spring 2000, pp. 6670; Gareth Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000). This essay includes material from other excellent and informative works by Winrow. Also see J. Robinson West and Julia Nanay, "Caspian Sea Infrastructure Projects," Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, June 2000, pp. It -21.

50 Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus, pp. 30-9.

51 For more on this topic, see Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey and Caspian Energy (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, No. 37, 1998, pp. 33-4.

52 National Public Radio (NPR), January 20, 2002.

53 William Safire's column in The New York Times, September 6, 2001. Indeed, Israel government authorities announced on January 16, 2002, that they would be glad to receive Jews who wanted to emigrate from Argentina to Israel as a result of that country's economic crisis. Argentina has an estimated population of 400,000 Jews.

54 For more on this topic, see Robert Olson, "Turkey-Israel-American Jewish Alliance, 1995-2000: Genesis and Implications," Turkey's Relations, pp. 125-165.

55 centralasianews@com, January 4, 2002. Reported by BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 31, 2002. BBC took the report from the Olaylar News Agency (Azerbaijan).

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